LEGAL/ACCOUNTING REGULATORY AGENCIES
the Board's agents (e.g., its investigators and AC members)
should not be attributed to the Board acting in its capacity as
a quasi-judicial body.
During the pendency of this judicial proceeding, the administrative hearing on CBA's accusation against KPMG commenced on March 15, 2000 before Administrative Law Judge
Humberto Flores, and concluded on December 29, 2000. On
behalf of the Board, the Attorney General's Office submitted
its closing briefs on February 15,2001, and-at this writingKPMG is scheduled to submit its closing briefs on May 7,2001.

At its November 2000 meeting, CBA elected Donna
McCluskey as president and public member Navid Sharafatian
as vice-president, and reelected Michael Schneider as secretary-treasurer for 2001.

FUTURE MEETINGS
2001: May 18 in Sacramento; July 20 in San Francisco;
September 21 in Los Angeles; November 16 in San Diego.
2002: January 24-25 in San Francisco; March 22-23 in
Los Angeles; May 16-17 in San Diego; July 19 in San Francisco; September 20 in Sacramento; November 14-15 in San
Diego.
2003: January 23-24 in Redwood City; March 21-22 in
Santa Monica; May 15-16 in San Diego; July 25 in San Francisco; September 19 in Los Angeles; November 14 in Sacramento.

RECENT MEETINGS
At its November 19, 1999 meeting, CBA elected public
member Baxter Rice as president, CPA Donna McCluskey as
vice-president, and CPA Michael Schneider as secretary-treasurer for 2000.

State Bar of California
Executive Officer: Judy Johnson * (415) 538-2000 (213) 765-1000 + Toll-Free ComplaintHotline:
1-800-843-9053 * Ethics Hotline: 1-800-2ETHICS * Internet: www.calbar.ca.gov
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as a public corporation within the judicial branch of government, and membership is a requirement for all attorneys practicing law in California. More than 175,000 lawyers are members of the State Bar.
The State Bar and its subdivisions perform a myriad of
functions that fall into six major categories: (1) testing State
Bar applicants, accrediting law schools, and promoting competence-based education; (2) enforcing the State Bar Act,
Business and Professions Code section 6000 et seq., and the
Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct; (3) ensuring the delivery of and access to legal services; (4) educating the public;
(5) improving the administration of justice; and (6) providing member services.
The State Bar maintains approximately 40 standing and
special committees including over 200 appointees and addressing numerous issues. Sixteen subject-matter "sections"
focus on specialized substantive areas of law-ranging from
antitrust law to workers' compensation to criminal law. These
sections, which are operated by volunteer committees, publish information about their respective subject areas and assist the Bar in administering its Minimum Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) program, which requires most Bar members to complete 25 hours of MCLE every three years. The
Bar also operates the Conference of Delegates, which gives a
representative voice to local, ethnic, and specialty bar associations statewide. Effective January 1, 2000, the Bar is prohibited from funding its sections and the Conference of Delegates with members' compulsory Bar licensing fees (see
MAJOR PROJECTS).

The Bar grants "specialty certification" status to over 3,600 attorneys who practice in one of eight
fields: appellate; criminal; estate planning, trust, and probate;
family; immigration and nationality; personal and small business bankruptcy; taxation; and workers' compensation. In general, attorneys may practice in these fields without certification, but meeting the Bar's substantive standards allow them
to advertise their "specialty certification" status.
The Bar also operates several service programs, including
its Legal Services Trust Fund Program. Established by the legislature in the early 1980s, this program is funded by interestbearing demand trust accounts held by attorneys for their clients; through a grant process, these funds are distributed to
legal services programs serving the poor statewide. The Legal
Services Trust Fund Program also distributes the Equal Access
Fund, a $10 million annual state fund for improving the administration of justice for low-income Californians.
The Bar is funded primarily by fees paid by attorneys
and applicants to practice law. Over two-thirds of the Bar's
annual budget is spent on its attorney discipline system, which
includes a toll-free complaint hotline and in-house professional investigators and prosecutors housed in the Office of
the Chief Trial Counsel. The California Bar's attorney discipline system also includes the nation's first full-time professional attorney discipline court which neither consists of nor
is controlled by practicing lawyers. The State Bar Court consists of the Hearing Department (which includes five fulltime judges who preside over individual disciplinary hearings) and a three-member Review Department which reviews
appeals from hearing judge decisions. The State Bar Court
recommends discipline to the California Supreme Court,
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which-prior to major reforms in the early 1990s- would consider each case and issue a written decision. Under the new
system and "finality rules" adopted by the Supreme Court in
1991, State Bar Court decisions must be appealed to the Supreme Court, and its review is discretionary (see LMGATION).
The Bar may impose a wide range of potential sanctions against
violators of the State Bar Act or the Rules of Professional Conduct; penalties can range from private reproval to disbarment,
and may include "involuntary inactive enrollment" (interim
suspension) under Business and Professions Code section 6007.
In connection with its discipline system, the Bar operates two
client assistance programs: its Client Security Fund, which attempts to compensate clients who are victims of attorney theft;
and its Mandatory Fee Arbitration Program, which arbitrates
fee disputes between attorneys and their clients in an informal,
out-of-court setting.
The State Bar Act designates a Board of Governors to
run the Bar. The Board President is elected by the Board of
Governors and serves a one-year term beginning in September. Only governors who have served on the Board for three
years are eligible to run for President.
The Board of Governors consists of 23 members: sixteen licensed attorneys, six non-lawyer public members, and
the Board President. Fifteen of the sixteen attorney members
are elected to the Board by lawyers in nine geographic districts; the sixteenth attorney member is a representative of
the California Young Lawyers Association (CYLA), appointed
by that organization's Board of Directors each year for a oneyear term. The Governor is authorized to appoint four of the
six public members; the Assembly Speaker and Senate Rules
Committee each appoint one public member. Each Board
member serves a three-year term, except for the CYLA representative (who serves for one year) and the Board President (who serves a fourth year when elected to the presidency).
Members' terms are staggered to provide for the election of
five attorneys and the appointment of two public members
each year.
In December 1999, Senate President pro Tempore John
Burton appointed a new public member, Democratic activist
and retired investor Manning J. Post, to the Board of Governors. Unfortunately, Post's term ended early with his death
on March 13, 2000. Senator Burton appointed retired actress
Julie Sommars to fill the vacancy. Sommars previously served
on the Commission on Judicial Performance.
In June 2000, Palmer Brown Madden was elected as 75th
president of the State Bar and was sworn in at the Bar's annual meeting in San Diego in September 2000. Madden recently opened a mediation service in Alamo after fourteen
years as a partner with McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen
in Walnut Creek.
On August 31,2000, five attorneys were elected to serve
three-year terms on the Board of Governors: Robert Keith
Persons (District 1) has a general civil practice in Butte
County; Erica R. Yew (District 3) is a partner with McManis
Faulkner & Morgan specializing in intellectual law and per-

sonal injury; Anthony P. Capozzi (District 5) is a sole practitioner working primarily as a federal trial attorney; Nancy J.
Hoffmeier Zamora (District 7) practices primarily in bankruptcy law and business litigation; and Judith M. Copeland
(District 9) is a probate specialist and partner at Copeland &
Tiernan.
The Board of Governors elected Karen S. Nobumoto as
State Bar President at a special meeting on March 13, 2001.
A Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney, Nobumoto
is the first government lawyer and the first minority woman
to serve as State Bar President. Elected from a field of five
candidates, Nobumoto will officially take office in September 2001. The early election is a new approach by the Board
of Governors, which agreed that a six-month period to prepare to serve as President would be beneficial for the most
efficient functioning of the Board.
On March 20,2001, after two years of inactivity, Governor Gray Davis appointed two public members to the State
Bar Board of Governors. Janet M. Green of Riverside is a
registered nurse and the Director of Health Services at San
Bernardino Valley College. Green has represented the public
in law-related matters as a member of the California Judicial
Council's Jury Instruction Task Force and a member of the
San Bernardino County Youth Justice Center Community
Action Council. Dr. John G. Snetsinger is a professor of history and Director of International Education and Programs at
California Polytechnic University at San Luis Obispo. He
served on the legislative committee of the California Faculty
Association. At this writing, two Governor-appointed public
member slots remain vacant.

MAJOR PROJECTS
Bar Hires Executive Director
In April 2000 after a nationwide search, the Board of
Governors selected Judy Johnson, the Bar's Chief Trial Counsel since 1994, as the Bar's new executive director. Johnson,
the first woman and first African-American appointed to the
job, oversees the day-to-day activities of the $80 million organization. Johnson replaces Steve Nissen, who left the office in March 1999. [17:1 CRLR 205] Johnson graduated from
Stanford University in 1971 and received her law degree from
the University of California at Davis' King Hall School of
Law in 1976. She worked briefly for the Legal Aid Society of
Alameda until 1977, when she became a deputy district attorney in San Francisco, specializing in consumer and major
fraud cases. She left that office in 1994 to become the Bar's
chief prosecutor. Johnson served on the Bar's Judicial Nominees Evaluation Commission from 1982-85, and was a member of the Board of Governors from 1990-93.

Bar Resumes Collecting Dues, Implements SB 144
In 1999, Governor Davis signed SB 144 (Schiff and
Hertzberg) (Chapter 342, Statutes of 1999), which once again
authorizes the Bar to collect mandatory licensing fees from
its members to support most of its traditional activities; SB
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144 is the Bar's first regular dues authorization since 1996.
Unhappy with many activities of the Bar, former Governor
Pete Wilson vetoed the Bar's dues bill in 1997, causing the
Bar to essentially shut down in 1998. Along with authorization to collect licensing fees, SB 144 also imposes restrictions on the use of those fees and on the Bar's legislative
activities, amends the provisions of its continuing education
program, and enacts other reforms aimed at perceived problems with the Bar's previous operations. Thus, thanks to SB
144, the Bar regained its funding source, but is struggling to
implement new limitations on how its funds may be used and
the scope of permissible activities.
SB 144 restricts total licensing fees to $395 annually
(compared to $478 in 1996 and $458 in 1997) and requires
the Bar to discount its fees for attorneys earning less than
$40,000 per year. SB 144 prohib-

Further, SB 144 requires the Bar to undergo external and
independent financial audits. It requires the Bar to contract with
a nationally recognized public accounting firm to conduct an
audit of the Bar's financial statements for each fiscal year after
December 31, 1998. It also requires the Bureau of State Audits
(BSA) to conduct a performance audit of the Bar's operations
from July 1, 2000, through December 1, 2000 (see below).
Beginning in 2002, the Bar must contract with BSA to conduct
a performance audit every two years of its operations for that
fiscal year. These audits must be submitted to the Board of
Governors, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
Judiciary Committees of the Senate and the Assembly. [17:1
CRLR 203-05; 16:2 CRLR 168-70; 16:1 CRLR 190-94]
The Bar has taken numerous actions to implement the
various provisions and limitations of SB 144, as follows:

*
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Board voted to apply these requirements to legislative posiBrosterhous lawsuit (see LITIGATION). SB 144 attempts
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* Expenditure Limitations.At its December 1999 meetthe bill precludes the Bar from spending a sum on non-Keller
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an interim basis. The Board approved a description of its activities and legislative program for 2000, together with the
chargeability determinations made by the Bar regarding these
activities and programs, and directed staff to publish the description in the January 2000 issue of the CaliforniaBar Journal. The Board then adopted interim procedures regarding
annual membership fees, chargeable and nonchargeable
amounts, reductions, and appeals. The interim rule sets forth
procedures for determining chargeable and nonchargeable
amounts, provides members with notice of the chargeability
determinations of the Bar, and gives members an opportunity
to object. The Board authorized staff to circulate the interim
procedures for a 90-day public comment period. Having received no comments, the Board approved these procedures
at its April 1, 2000 meeting.
On February 5, 2000, the Board approved the distribution of an informational document outlining the tests for
chargeability under the Keller and Brosterhousdecisions (see
LITIGATION) and summarizing Bar activities permitted and
prohibited under the Brosterhous analysis. The Board also
decided, pending clarification or appellate review of that decision, that no matter falling outside the parameters of
Brosterhouswill be placed on the agenda of any Bar committee or commission unless the matter or its consideration involves no expenditure of mandatory dues.
* Fee Scaling.At its December 1999 meeting, the Board
of Governors approved a change to article 1, section 7.1 of
the rules and regulations of the State Bar to provide for a
scaling option for Bar dues for members earning less than
$40,000 per year or less than $25,000 per year from the practice of law, as required by SB 144. Under the amended rule,
Bar members who believe they are eligible for fee scaling
must provide documentation of income to the Bar by February 1 of the year in which the fee is payable. Attorneys earning less than $40,000 qualify for a 25% fee reduction; those
earning less than $25,000 qualify for a 50% fee reduction.
On February 5, 2000, the Board again amended article 1,
section 7.1 of its rules and regulations to give a member whose
application for fee scaling is denied the opportunity for review
of the denial by the Board's Committee on Administration and
Finance or its designee. The amendments also specify the documentation required to prove eligibility for fee scaling.
At its April 2001 meeting, the Board again modified article 1, section 7.1 of its rules and regulations regarding fee
scaling to extend the deadline for applying for scaled fees to
March 15 of each year, to correspond with the date late penalties attach for non-scaling members.
* Minimum Continuing Legal Education. SB 144 also
made substantive changes to the Bar's MCLE program requirements. Specifically, SB 144 reduces the Bar's MCLE
requirement from 36 hours every three years to 25 hours every three years, makes express legislative findings that it is in
the public interest to continue the MCLE requirement for attorneys licensed to practice law, deletes a previous exception
to the MCLE requirement for retired judges, makes express

legislative findings underlying the remaining exceptions to
the requirement, and requires the Bar to provide and encourage the development of no-cost and low-cost programs and
materials for satisfying the MCLE requirement (with special
emphasis upon the use of Internet capabilities and computer
technology in the development and provision of these programs). [17:1 CRLR 204,206] In December 1999, the Board
published proposed amendments to Rule 958, California Rules
of Court (Minimum Continuing Legal Education) and the
Bar's MCLE Rules and Regulations to conform with the requirements of SB 144. The Board accepted public comment
on the proposed changes through March 10, 2000. On June
10, 2000, the Board voted to slightly modify the proposed
changes in response to comments received and to recommend
that the California Supreme Court approve the amendments
to Rule 958. The Supreme Court approved the Bar's amendments to Rule 958 on September 27, 2000.
Also in June 2000, the Board of Governors approved the
expenditure of $40,000 to conduct a poll of about 600 lawyers concerning their opinions of the Bar's MCLE program.
The poll results will be used by the Bar's MCLE Evaluation
Commission, which was appointed in June 1999 and charged
with examining all aspects of the MCLE program and making recommendations to the Board.
* BSA Completes SB 144-RequiredA udit. In April 2001,
the Bureau of State Audits (BSA) released State Bar of California: It Has Improved Its Disciplinary Process, Stewardship of Members'Fees,and Administrative Practices,but Its
Cost Recovery and Controls Over Expenses Need Strengthening, its report on the State Bar required by SB 144. BSA
noted that after January 1, 2000, SB 144 prohibits the Bar
from using mandatory fees to support voluntary programs such
as the Conference of Delegates and its subject-matter sections, or to support certain lobbying activities that exceed the
Keller mandate; however, SB 144 authorizes the Bar to collect voluntary fees to support the Conference and the sections.
BSA noted that, in response to SB 144, the Bar established two new funds to account for the activities of the Conference of Delegates and for lobbying activities outside the
scope of Keller (a separate fund for section activities was
already in place). BSA found that the Bar also took action to
ensure that mandatory fees are not used to provide administrative support for section activities.
On annual membership statements for 2000, members
were asked to make voluntary contributions of $3 to support
the Conference; these contributions totaled about $84,000.
Expenses for Conference activities for the year were approximately $70,000; according to BSA, no mandatory fees were
used to support Conference activities during 2000.
Also in response to SB 144, the Bar created the Legislative Activities Fund to account separately for revenues and
expenses related to lobbying activities that exceed the Keller
mandate. Revenues recorded to this account in 2000 included
$644,000 (from attorneys who chose to support Keller-viola-
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fault rules, and early settlement conference policies, and slowly
rehired discipline system staff- including prosecutors, investigators, and support staff. Subsequent reports issued in June
and September 1999 documented progress made as the Bar
slowly worked to rebuild its discipline system.
During his term as Special Master, Justice Lui authorized the hiring of 390.5 discipline-related staff; by March
11, 2000, the Bar had filled 331.5 of those positions (some
with previous Bar employees and some with new employees). Justice Lui's final report analyzed the status of enforcement system staffing and the status of case backlogs at the
Office of the Chief Trial Counsel, the State Bar Court, and
the Office of General Counsel, and made general recommendations regarding State Bar operations and appropriate uses
for the remaining balance in the Discipline Fund, as follows:
* Office of the Chief TrialCounsel. Accumulated cases which now consist not only of old complaints and cases that
came in and were abated during the shutdown but also new
complaints filed since January 1999-are divided into (1) inquiries-written complaints about the conduct of an attorney
that are initially reviewed by the intake unit of the Office of
the Chief Trial Counsel (OCTC), (2) investigations-matters
that have survived intake and are currently being investigated
by OCTC's investigative staff, and (3) trial counsel matters completed investigations that are being reviewed or prosecuted by OCTC attorneys before the State Bar Court.
With the benefit of added staff, OCTC has substantially
reduced the number of inquiries in intake from 4,050 on March
1, 1999 to 2,201 on March 1,2000. Justice Lui noted that the
number of pending inquiries on March 1,2000 is up from the
Bar Rebuilds Attorney Discipline System
1,697 that were pending as of his third report in September
After then-Governor Wilson vetoed the Bar's dues bill
1999. To remedy this problem, the Bar-in January 2000in 1997, the Bar twice petitioned the California Supreme Court
created and filled six complaint analyst positions for its into order attorneys to pay their license fees. When the Court
take unit and temporarily assigned three attorneys to review
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these inquiries; the Bar believes this infusion of resources
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926 on March 1,2000. Overall, as of March 1, 2000, OCTC
* FinalReport on Attorney DisciplineSystem. On March
maintained an inventory of 7,478 open matters (including
28, 2000, Special Master Lui filed his fourth and final report
1,603 cases in its "backlog"-the "backlog" consists of nondocumenting the progress of the State Bar in rebuilding its atcomplex matters pending in OCTC for more than six months
torney discipline system. In his initial February 1999 report,
and complex matters pending in OCTC for more than one
Justice Lui reported that the Bar's discipline system faced an
year). That total inventory figure is down from 10,572 on
unprecedented backlog of over 7,000 open complaints and reMarch 1, 1999. In his report, Justice Lui attributed this imports against attorneys from consumers and courts. To deal with
provement largely to OCTC's use of a prioritization system.
the backlog, the Bar instituted new prioritization policies, de-

tive lobbying by the Bar by not taking the $5 Hudson deduction) and $35,000 in interest income. Expenses paid from this
fund were primarily payroll expenses for staff time spent on
2000 lobbying on legislation that was not chargeable to mandatory fees. BSA noted the Bar's improved procedures in
tracking and reporting staff time spent on legislative activities. The auditor's findings and recommendations concerning attorney discipline are discussed below.
* 2001 BarDues.In contrast to SB 144, SB 1367 (Schiff)
(Chapter 118, Statutes of 2000)-the Bar's dues bill for
2001 -was enacted with little or no controversy and signed
by the Governor on July 7, 2000. SB 1367 again authorizes
the Bar to collect a maximum of $395 per member for annual
dues-including $318 in basic membership fees plus $77 in
other required fees (see 2000 LEGISLATION).
* 2002 Bar Dues. At its November 2000 meeting, the
Board voted unanimously to seek 2001 legislation reducing
Bar dues by $50 for 2002. The maximum $345 annual payment would include a $295 basic membership fee, $10 for
the Bar's building fund, and $40 for the Client Security Fund.
The proposed reduction in fees was attributed to a $15 million budget surplus caused by continuing staff shortages resulting from the Bar's 1998 shutdown.
At this writing, SB 352 (Kuehl)-pending in the legislature-would enable the Bar to fulfill its promise. SB 352 is
actually a two-year dues bill that would authorize the Bar to
charge up to $310 in basic membership fees during both 2002
and 2003 (see 2001 LEGISLATION).
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0 State Bar Court. In his final report, Justice Lui found
that as of March 1,2000, the State Bar Court had filled 27 of
its 37 authorized positions, but noted that many of the vacant
positions will remain unfilled unless and until they are justified by increases in the State Bar Court's workload. As of
March 1,2000, 356 open cases remained in the Hearing Department and 42 open cases were pending in the Review Department. As of March 3, 2000, the State Bar Court reported
that 26 cases were held in abatement, the majority of which
were proceedings in which there was a mental competency
proceeding pending or in which a recommendation of disbarment had been filed or was pending before the Supreme Court
in another proceeding.
The report found that the number of new cases initiated
in the State Bar Court remained below historical levels. In
1999, 516 new cases were filed, including 456 disciplinary
cases and 51 regulatory matters (moral character admission
matters, reinstatement petitions, and requests for involuntary
inactive enrollment). In contrast, in 1996, 901 disciplinary
proceedings and 180 regulatory proceedings were filed in the
State Bar Court; in 1997, 956 disciplinary proceedings and
168 regulatory matters were filed.
* Office of General Counsel. By March 2000, the Bar's
Office of General Counsel (OGC) had filled all authorized
staff positions. OGC reported that, as of March 3, 2000, there
were 15 discipline cases before the California Supreme Court
or on appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court, 22 pending In re
Walker petitions, and one pending request for depublication
of a Review Department decision, which OGC filed on behalf of OCTC. In addition, OGC reported that, as of March 3,
2000, it had 66 open discipline-related civil matters, including actions brought by complaining witnesses or respondents
against the State Bar, subpoenas for discipline records, laborrelated cases involving disciplined staff employees, and bankruptcies in which the debtor owes discipline costs and/or reimbursement to the Client Security Fund.
* OtherRecommendations. Justice Lui's final report also

contained the following recommendations concerning the
general structure and operations of the Bar, as well as suggestions for the disbursement of funds remaining in the Discipline Fund:
(1) Justice Lui suggested that the current budget process
be amended to permit the Bar to budget for a three-year period rather than a one-year period. "Currently, representatives
of the State Bar must spend a large portion of each year in
Sacramento lobbying for the State Bar's fee bill for the following year. Not only does this create an unhealthy obsession with the annual budget, but more significantly, it precludes the State Bar from making long-term strategic plans."
Justice Lui recommended that the Bar seek legislation establishing a "rolling three-year budget," during which period the
Bar would be permitted to seek budget increases from the
legislature as necessary.
(2) The Board of Governors should focus on policy issues affecting the State Bar, and permii State Bar executives

and administrators to focus on the day-to-day management
of the Bar. "Although the Board's interest in the daily affairs
of the State Bar evidences the Board's legitimate concern for
the operations of the State Bar," Lui wrote in his report to the
Supreme Court, "when the Board becomes overly involved
with such details, both the Board and the State Bar (and therefore its members and the public) suffer....The able and
full-time State Bar executives and administrators are in a better
position to make, and should be free to make, day-to-day
management decisions and to implement the Board's policy
directives." In this regard, Justice Lui urged the Bar to recruit
and hire as its Executive Director a strong management-oriented person with full authority to make day-to-day management and budget decisions.
(3) The Bar should continue to improve its information
management system, restructure its information systems and
technology department, create a Director of Information Systems and Technology position reporting directly to the Executive Director, provide for routine maintenance and updating of computer hardware and software, create staff positions
in each department to address technology-related problems,
and utilize contract services and Bar employees to maintain
and expand its Web site and online services.
(4) With respect to the discipline system itself, Justice
Lui recommended that OCTC improve and streamline its process of drafting notices to show cause (the formal disciplinary complaint); refine its procedures for determining appropriate sanctions; simplify the processing of default cases, in
conjunction with the State Bar Court; develop and implement,
with the State Bar Court, a minor misconduct program to deal
with minor disciplinary cases; develop and implement a volunteer attorney specialist program to mediate lower-priority
cases; and improve its phone line service for judicial inquiries regarding attorney discipline records. Justice Lui recommended that the State Bar Court reduce the length of its opinions; improve and formalize effective case management, including procedures for Early Neutral Evaluations; and conduct initial and substantive status conferences.
- Fund Status. Justice Lui reported that as of March 23,
2000, more than $3.7 million in unappropriated funds remained in the Discipline Fund. He suggested that the funds
be used on either the Bar's discipline functions or on the
maintenance and enhancement of State Bar technology.
Justice Lui's service as Special Master of the State Bar
Attorney Discipline Fund was concluded by order of the Supreme Court on July 23, 2000. Following Justice Lui's recommendations, the Court ordered that the money remaining
in the Discipline Fund be held in a separate account and that
a decision concerning their use to improve the discipline system and the Bar's technology be made by the Bar's Senior
Executive Team, and authorized by the Executive Director.
* ABA Committee to Study Workload Standards amt
Disciplinary System in California. SB 1420 (Burton) (Chapter 246, Statutes of 2000) requires the State Bar to review its
workload standards with respect to disciplinary activities "in-
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cluding, but not limited to, the State Bar Court and the Client
authorize its participation in this program, and previous efSecurity Fund, and provide guidance to the State Bar and the
forts in 1997 to obtain legislative support for this proposal
Legislature in allocating resources," and submit a report to
were unsuccessful. BSA also recommended that the State Bar
the legislature by June 30,2001 (see 2000 LEGISLATION).
update its cost model using current salary costs.
On August 26, 2000, the Board unanimously voted to ask the
SB 143 Changes State Bar Court Composition,
American Bar Association's (ABA) Standing Committee on
Appointment Authority
Professional Discipline to conduct the study required under
the legislation. The ABA committee has conducted more than
Effective November 1, 2000, SB 143 (Burton) (Chapter
40 similar reviews of state bar discipline systems since 1980.
221, Statutes of 1999) changed the composition of the State
The ABA will pay some of the costs of the review itself, but
Bar Court and transferred the appointing authority for three
asked for a State Bar contribution of $10,000.
of the five State Bar Court judges from the California Su* BSA Reports Improvements in Bar's Disciplinary
preme Court to the Governor, the Senate Rules Committee,
Process. As noted above, BSA released its SB 144-required
and the Speaker of the Assembly. Prior to the enactment of
report on the State Bar's disciplinary process in April 2001.
SB 143, the State Bar Court consisted of a hearing panel of
five judges who preside over evidentiary hearings, and a threeThe auditors found that the State Bar has made significant
progress in improving its disciplinary process since the 1998
judge Review Department consisting of the Presiding Judge
shutdown. The audit attributed
of the State Bar Court, one attorthese gains to the complaint
ney judge, and one non-attorney
prioritization system that allows BSA released its SB 144,*rei quired report on the State judge. Each of the judges was
's in April 2001. The auditors appointed by the California Suinvestigators to focus on the most B ad
S
ar
serious disciplinary cases-those
found that the State Bar has rmade significant progress preme Court upon nomination by
that pose the most significant in improving its discipli na! process since the 1998 the court's Applicant Evaluation
threat of harm to the public-first, shutdown.
and Nomination Committee. SB
"The State Bar has implemented
143 eliminates the non-attorney
reasonable methods for dealing with the numerous complaints
judge position on the Review Department and replaces it with
an attorney judge position. Further, SB 143 permits the Suthat have accumulated in its backlog of disciplinary cases,"
according to the report. Further, BSA noted that the State Bar
preme Court to appoint only two of the five Hearing Departhas revised its cost model, which should result in greater cost
ment judges, with the remaining three judges to be appointed
recovery from attorneys being disciplined. Using the new
by the Governor, the Senate Rules Committee, and the Speaker
model, the State Bar has more than doubled the maximum
of the Assembly. According to the bill's author, the intent in
amount it can charge an attorney for the costs of investigatrevamping the appointment authority was to bring a broader
ing and pursuing disciplinary acdiversity of opinion to the State
tion.
Bar Court and to make that court
Effective November 1, 2000, SB 143 (Burton) (Chapter
However, BSA also found
more closely resemble the struc221, Statutes of 1999) changed the composition of the
that the costs actually collected
ture of the Commission on JudiState Bar Court and transferred the appointing
from offending attorneys declined
cial Performance, which disciauthority for three of the five State Bar Court judges
in 2000 compared with amounts
plines judges. The Bar took no pofrom the California Supreme Court to the Governor, the
sition on SB 143 because it was
collected in 1995. Of $1,079,922
Senate Rules Committee, and the Speaker of the
billed to disciplined attorneys in
double-joined to SB 144, its dues
Assembly.
2000, the State Bar collected only
bill. [17:1 CRLR 209]
$311,061 (28.8%). The only way
In January 2000, three State
the State Bar can collect these amounts is by pursuing a forBar Court judges petitioned the California Supreme Court
for a writ of mandate, asking that the new law be struck down.
mal court judgment against the attorney, or by adding the costs
In Obrien v. Jones, the State Bar Court judges argued that the
to the attorney's annual dues bill. Since the disciplined attorney may be insolvent or no longer in practice, the potential
new law politicizes the appointment process, infringes upon
the Supreme Court's own inherent power over attorney discifor actual collection of this cost recovery is limited. BSA
pline, and violates the state constitution's separation of powstated: "Because the State Bar's recovery efforts are poor, it
ers doctrine. By a 4-3 vote, the Supreme Court upheld the
uses a greater portion of membership fees than necessary to
support its Client Security Fund and disciplinary programs.
constitutionality of the provisions, holding that its primary
authority over the practice of law is not defeated or materiConsequently, members must pay a fee that is higher than
necessary." The auditors recommended that the State Bar
ally impaired by SB 143's changes to the State Bar Court
participate in the state's "Offset Program," which allows the
appointment process (see LITIGATION).
In November 2000, two Review Department judges were
State Controller's Office and the Franchise Tax Board to offreappointed and three new hearing judges were appointed
set from an individual's tax return any amounts owed from
under the new procedures. Senate President pro Tempore John
state agencies. According to the Bar, legislation is required to

v
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Burton, the author of SB 143, appointed Senate Judiciary
Committee staff attorney Jodi Remke to a hearing judge post;
Remke previously served as a legal advocate on housing issues, was a legal services attorney, and practiced real estate
law in Oakland. Remke will serve a four-year term. Assembly Speaker Robert Hertzberg appointed Los Angeles attorney Paul Bacigalupo as a hearing judge, replacing Madge
Watai (who was elevated to the Review Department by the
Supreme Court). Prior to his appointment, Bacigalupo was a
litigator at Castle & Lax; his appointment is for two years.
Governor Davis named Robert Talcott, a former member of
the Bar of Governors, to a six-year term as a hearing judge.
Talcott served as the president of the Los Angeles Police
Commission and is the senior and founding partner of Talcott,
Lightfoot, Vandevelde, Sadowsky, Medvene & Levine.
The Supreme Court announced its reappointment of
Judge Ronald Stovitz to the Review Department and named
Judge Watai to the Review Department to replace Kenneth
Norian, the public member of the Department whose position was eliminated by SB 143. Stovitz has been a Review
Department judge since 1989 when the State Bar Court was
established. Watai was a Superior Court judge in Los Angeles before becoming a hearing judge in the State Bar Court.

Diversion Program for Impaired Attorneys
At its January 26, 2001 meeting, the Board of Governors
agreed to cosponsor legislation to create an Attorney Diversion and Assistance Program for lawyers with substance abuse
or mental illness problems. The bill, SB 479 (Burton), would
require the Board to establish and administer an attorney diversion and assistance program (see 2001 LEGISLATION).
As amended April 30, 2001, SB 479 would fund the program
through an annual charge of $10 to each active member of
the Bar. The bill would add sections 6230-6238 to the Business and Professions Code. New section 6230 would state
the intent of the legislature that the Bar "seek ways and means
to identify and rehabilitate attorneys with impairment due to
abuse of dangerous drugs or alcohol, or due to mental illness,
affecting competency so that attorneys so afflicted may be
treated and returned to the practice of law in a manner that
will not endanger the public health and safety."
New section 6231 would provide for the establishment
and administration of the attorney diversion program, and
establish a committee to oversee the operation of the program. The committee would consist of twelve memberseight appointed by the Board of Governors (including one
physician and two other licensed mental health professionals
with knowledge and expertise in the identification and treatment of alcoholism and substance abuse, one member of the
board of directors of a statewide nonprofit organization that
assists lawyers with alcohol or substance abuse problems, and
four attorney members-one of whom is in recovery with at
least five years' sobriety), two public members appointed by
the Governor, one public member appointed by the Speaker
of the Assembly, and one public member appointed by the

Senate Rules Committee. Committee members would serve
three-year terms and would be authorized to adopt regulations as needed to implement and operate the program. Section 6232 would allow the committee to establish criteria for
acceptance, denial, or termination of attorneys in the diversion program. Section 6232 would also provide that attorneys may enter the program through voluntary self-referral,
or by referral from the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel or
the State Bar Court. New section 6235 would provide that
participants in the program are responsible for all expenses
related to treatment and recovery, but would require the Bar
to establish a financial assistance program to ensure that attorneys would not be denied acceptance into the program
based solely on inability to pay.
At the Board's April 11, 2001 meeting, James D. Otto,
Chair of the Board's Committee on Regulation and Discipline, briefed the Board concerning estimated costs and funding for the proposed diversion program. Using the Medical
Board's physician diversion program as a model, the Bar estimates that, after initial evaluation costs of $300-$5,000 per
participant, the cost of participation for each attorney participant will be about $5,000-$6,000 annually. A five-year minimum period of participation is expected. Otto also outlined
the proposed staffing level and budget requirements to operate the program, but stated that attorneys will not be denied
access if they cannot afford the cost of the diversion program.

Bar to Improve Public Disclosure
of Attorney Discipline
Like the Web sites of many other California occupational
licensing agencies, the State Bar's Web site includes a "licensee look-up" feature enabling members of the public to
determine whether an attorney is in fact a member of the
California Bar. If so, the Bar discloses the attorney's current
membership status, address and telephone number of record,
the date of the member's admission to practice, and the name
of the college and law school attended. Unlike many other
agencies, however, the Bar does not disclose details about its
own prior disciplinary actions on its Web site; nor does it
disclose information about disciplinary charges filed, criminal convictions, civil malpractice judgments, other-state disciplinary actions, or other public information indicating unfitness to practice. The Bar's Web site simply reveals whether
a given attorney has a "public record of discipline" or "no
public record of discipline." If an attorney has a "public record
of discipline" and a member of the public wants more information, he/she must write a letter to the Bar requesting that
information, and include a blank check. In other words,
whereas other agencies instantly disclose licensee misconduct information on their Web sites for free, the Bar limits
disclosure to its own final disciplinary actions, charges up to
$30 for that information, and requires people to wait weeks
to get it.
The public disclosure issue has been complicated by the
Bar's fiscal status and by the pendency of a lawsuit filed by
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disclosure of "private reprovals with public disclosure" imattorney Michael Mack challenging the Bar's public discloposed prior to July 1,2000.
sure policy regarding private reprovals (see LITIGATION).
At this writing, the Bar has not yet implemented the
At its December 1999 meeting, however, the Board's ComBoard's February 2000 decision.
mittee on Regulation and Discipline finally recommended that
more detailed information regarding State Bar members' disMultidisciplinary Practice
ciplinary records and changes in membership status be posted
on the Bar's Web site. The Committee recommended that the
Since 1999, both the ABA and the State Bar have
following information be added to the Web site: (1) informastruggled with the "multidisciplinary practice" (MDP) contion on changes in the membership
cept, under which lawyers could
status of a member (including the
share fees and establish business
si
type of suspension or inactive en- Whereas other agencies nstantly disclose licensee partnerships with nonlawyerson
rollment, the year in which the
misconduct information their Web sites for free, the both of which are prohibited unsuspension or inactive enrollment
Bar limits disclosure t its own final disciplinary der current rules of professional
was imposed, and the case num- actions, charges up toi ;30 for that information, and conduct.
'eeks to get it.
In June 1999, the ABA's
ber, if any, relating to the suspension or inactive enrollment); and
(2) enhanced information on disciplinary actions taken, including the type or level of discipline imposed, the year in
which discipline was imposed, and the State Bar Court or
Supreme Court case number relating to the particular imposition of discipline. Interested members of the public must
still write to the Bar and pay a charge for detailed information on Bar disciplinary action.
However, the Committee recommended that information
regarding stipulated "private reprovals" -which, despite their
name, are public information if issued following the filing of
formal charges -not be posted on the Web site until the Bar
amends its rules of procedure; instead, members of the public will be instructed to call the Bar for information on private reprovals. On February 5,2000, the Board of Governors
approved the Committee's proposal, and subsequently
amended Rule 270 of the Bar's Rules of Procedure to clarifyeffective July 1,2000-that private reprovals issued after the
filing of a notice to show cause (so-called "private reprovals
with public disclosure") are public information and will be
disclosed on the Bar's Web site; private reprovals imposed
prior to the filing of a notice to show cause will not be posted
on the Bar's Web site or disclosed in response to public inquiries. In other words, information about "private reprovals
with public disclosure" will appear on the Bar's Web site if
they are issued after July 1, 2000; if they were issued prior to
that date, the Web site will instruct an interested party to call
the Bar for more information.
On May 17,2000, the Los Angeles County Superior Court
dismissed attorney Mack's challenge to the Bar's disclosure
of his private reproval. As a result, Bar senior management
unanimously recommended that the Committee on Regulation and Discipline reconsider its February 2000 decision,
and instead treat all "private reprovals with public disclosure"
equally by disclosing all of them on the Bar's Web site regardless of when they were issued. Staff argued that all information on "private reprovals with public disclosure" is public anyway, and posting that information on the Web site would
benefit the public and lighten staff workload. At its August
25,2000 meeting, the Committee voted 4-3 against Web site

Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice recommended that the ABA amend its model rules
to "permit lawyers, subject to carefully defined standards, to
deliver services to clients through a new practice vehicle, a
multidisciplinary practice." The Commission defined an MDP
as "a partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has
as one, but not all of its purposes, the delivery of legal services to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or that holds
itself out to the public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal,
services. It includes an arrangement by which a law firm joins
with one or more other professional firms to provide services,
and there is a direct or indirect sharing of profits as part of
the arrangement." Under the recommendation, lawyers in
MDPs would remain subject to all rules of professional conduct, except that they would be permitted to form an MDP
and share legal fees with a nonlawyer in an MDP for the purpose of the delivery of legal services. Further, the MDP would
be subject to certain certification and audit procedures designed to protect the interests of clients and the public while
maintaining the core values of the legal profession-"specifically, professional independence of judgment, the protection of confidential client information, and loyalty to the client through the avoidance of conflict of interest." The ABA
Commission stressed that its recommendation does not permit a nonlawyer to deliver legal services.
The Commission's initial recommendation would have
required the amendment of ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 5.4, which prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees
with a nonlawyer or forming a partnership with a nonlawyer
if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law. The ABA's adoption of the recommendation
(which, absent action by the State Bar to amend California's
Rules of Professional Conduct, is not binding in California)
would have created an exception to Model Rule 5.4 in the
case of MDPs that conform to nine specified safeguards.
In July 1999, the Board of Governors approved a recommendation from the Bar's Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct (COPRAC) that the Board instruct its
delegates to the 1999 ABA convention to suggest deferral of
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the MDP issue until the ABA further studies and solicits comIn July 2000, after two years of investigation and discusments from outside the ABA on this important issue. At its
sion of the issue, the ABA's House of Delegates again reAugust 1999 meeting, the ABA's House of Delegates considjected the recommendation of the MDP Commission, voting
ered the MDP Commission's recommendation, but voted 304by a 3-1 margin that multidisciplinary practice is "inconsis98 to defer action until the issue has been further studied by
tent with the core values of the legal profession." The House
state and local bar associations and the ABA itself. [17:1 CRLR
of Delegates also voted against a resolution of the MDP Commission, supported by the Califor207-08] The ABA resolution said
nia delegation, to defer action on
that the ABA should make no
changes to the Model Rules until In July 2000, after two ye, ars of investigation and MDP until more reports on the isadditional study demonstrates that discussion of the issue, theAeBA's House of Delegates sue from 33 state bars-including
such changes "will further the pub- again rejected the rec om mendation of the MDP California's-are received. The
lic interest without sacrificing or Commission, voting by a 3-1' margin that multidisciplin- House of Delegates thanked and
;tent
compromising lawyer indepen- ary practice is "inconsis t with the core values of discharged the Commission on
dence and the legal profession's the legal profession."
Multidisciplinary Practice, essentradition of loyalty to clients."
tially referring all future MDP isIn response to the ABA's August 1999 resolution, the MDP
sues to its Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Commission conducted more public hearings and solicited adResponsibility.
ditional comment with respect to this issue and issued an upAt this writing, the State Bar's Task Force on
dated background report in December 1999. At its February
Multidisciplinary Practice is still engaged in its study of vari2000 midyear meeting, the ABA conducted a Town Hall Meetous MDP models, and is expected to submit its report and
ing and webcast on multidisciplinary practice. On March 22,
findings to the Board of Governors in mid-2001.
2000, the MDP Commission issued a "Draft of a Possible RecEthics 2000 Commission Releases
ommendation to the ABA House of Delegates" with a narrower
proposal than that contained in its 1999 report. The 2000 reProposed Changes to Attorney Ethics Rules
port and recommendation was posted on the ABA's Web site
On November 27, 2000, a blue-ribbon ABA commission
in May 2000. The MDP Commission recommended:
called the "Ethics 2000 Commission" released its proposals to
* Lawyers should be permitted to share fees and join with
revise professional ethics rules for attorneys-proposals that
nonlawyer professionals in a practice that delivers both legal
prompted much scrutiny and attention from attorney groups
and nonlegal professional services (multidisciplinary pracacross California and the United States. The Ethics 2000 retice), provided that the lawyers have the control and authorport does not amend the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
ity necessary to assure lawyer independence in the rendering
Conduct-such action could occur only through the ABA's
of legal services. The term "nonlawyer professionals" means
House of Delegates. Further, the Model Rules themselves are
members of recognized professions or other disciplines that
not binding unless adopted by a state. At this writing, ABA
are governed by ethical standards.
delegates are scheduled to convene and address the suggested
* This recommendation must be implemented in a manchanges at their annual meeting in Chicago in August 2001.
ner that protects the public and preserves the core values of
Although the ABA's Model Rules are not binding in Calithe legal profession, including competence, independence of
fornia, changes to them may prompt the legislature to amend
professional judgment, protection of confidential client inthe State Bar Act or the State Bar to recommend revisions to
formation, loyalty to the client through the avoidance of conthe Rules of Professional Conduct. Notable changes in the Ethflicts of interest, and pro bono publico obligations.
ics 2000 proposal include modifications to rules regarding dis• Regulatory authorities should enforce existing rules and
closure of client confidences, discipline of law firms, and stanadopt such additional enforcement procedures as are needed
dards for conflicts of interest. The Commission proposes that
to implement these principles and to protect the public interlawyers should be allowed to disclose client confidences to
est.
prevent or mitigate financial harm or fraud. Currently, disclo. The prohibition on nonlawyers delivering legal services
sure of client confidences under the existing Model Rules is
and the obligations of all lawyers to observe the rules of proallowed only to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.
fessional conduct should not be altered.
Critics of the proposal claim that such disclosures would vio- Passive investment in a multidisciplinary practice should
late fiduciary duties inherent in a lawyer's role as a profesnot be permitted.
sional and undermine client confidence. Business and ProfesSimultaneously, in May 2000, then-State Bar President
sions Code section 6068(e) requires that an attorney keep cliAndy Guilford appointed a Task Force on Multidisciplinary
ent confidences "inviolate" and provides no exception for imPractice and charged it with determining whether there are
minent death, bodily harm, financial harm, or fraud.
viable MDP models for California that preserve the critical
The Commission's proposal allowing the discipline of
role of the attorney as an officer of the court in the adminislaw firms is also controversial. The proposed rule would retration of justice and the "core values" of that role.
quire a law firm to "make reasonable efforts to ensure that
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the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance
that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct." Critics point out logistical problems with
disciplining a firm, which is not licensed by the state; only
individual attorneys are licensed and subject to discipline
under the existing system.
The Commission also suggests changes in the conflict of
interest rules to allow a law firm to "screen off" a lawyer in
order to avoid conflicts of interest involving the lawyer's
former clients. Other proposals would require written fee
agreements between attorneys and clients and would prohibit
attorneys from having sexual relationships with clients; California already has laws in these latter two areas.

Task Force on Multijurisdictional Practice
SB 1782 (Morrow) (Chapter 247, Statutes of 2000) states
the legislature's intent that the California Supreme Court adopt
rules allowing attorneys who are licensed in other states to be
admitted to practice law in California without passing the California Bar examination, and requests the Supreme Court to
establish a task force to study the issue of reciprocity for Bar
admissions (see 2000 LEGISLATION). In response, the Supreme Court created an 18-member panel to study this issue,
chaired by former Bar president Raymond Marshall of
McCutchen Doyle Brown & Enersen. At this writing, the task
force is expected to make its recommendations to the Supreme Court in fall 2001.
The ABA has formed a Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice of Law, which has also been studying the issue of multijurisdictional practice and is expected to issue its
final recommendations in May 2001. At its January 2001
meeting, the Board of Governors voted to ask the ABA commission to extend its consideration of this issue to allow the
State Bar and other states more time to provide input.

Bar Considers Shorter Examination
In December 2000, State Bar executives met with law
school deans from around the state to discuss proposals to
shorten the three-day Bar examination to two days, and to
discuss the possible addition of new areas of law to the examination. The proposed changes are intended to cut costs of
administering the examination and to make the test less burdensome for applicants. The Bar is considering either eliminating the California Performance Test or adopting the National Conference of Bar Examiner's Multistate Performance
Test, which is 90 minutes shorter than California's performance test. The Bar suggests adding to or expanding the essay portion of the test to address business associations, civil
procedure, contracts and commercial law, evidence, and family law. At this writing, no action on the proposal has been
taken.

Recent Bar Exam Pass Rates
The July 1999 Bar examination had a 51.2% pass rate.
First-time takers enjoyed a 68.5% pass rate; only 18.9% of
California Regulatory Law Reporter * Volume 17, No. 2 (Winter 2001)

repeat applicants passed. First-time applicants who attended
ABA-accredited law schools had a pass rate of 68.5%; firsttime applicants who attended schools accredited by the State
Bar had a 33.3% pass rate.
For the February 2000 examination, the pass rate was
40%, as compared to 41.1% on the February 1999 examination. First-time takers had a 51.3% pass rate; 34.7% of repeat
takers passed the examination. Graduates of ABA-accredited
schools who took the test for the first time had a 50.1% pass
rate; first-time takers who attended State Bar-approved
schools had a 30.3% pass rate.
The overall pass rate for the July 2000 bar examination
was 55.3%. First-time takers enjoyed a 64.3% pass rate; 25.3%
of repeat takers were successful. First-time applicants from
ABA-accredited law schools passed at a 71.7% rate; only
28.6% of those attending State Bar-accredited schools passed.

2000 LEGISLATION
SB 1367 (Schiff), as amended March 9, 2000, extends
the Bar's 2000 basic membership fee of $318 to 2001. Together with other fees totaling $77, this bill authorizes the
State Bar to collect $395 in total Bar dues during 2001. This
provision was contingent on the passage of SB 1420 (Burton), which became law on August 24,2000 (see below). SB
1367 was signed into law on July 7, 2000 (Chapter 118, Statutes of 2000).
SB 1420 (Burton), as amended June 27, 2000, repeals
existing law authorizing the Board of Governors to screen
and rate all applicants for appointment or reappointment as a
State Bar Court Hearing Department judge, and instead provides that those applicants must be screened and reviewed by
an applicant evaluation committee as directed by the California Supreme Court (see LITIGATION). SB 1420 also provides that the Review Department will employ a de novo standard of review in reviewing decisions, orders, or rulings by a
hearing judge of the Hearing Department, as established by
the California Supreme Court in February 2000 in Rule 951.5
of the California Rules of Court (or as otherwise specified by
the Supreme Court in Rule 951.5).
Existing law authorizes the Board of Governors to appointprotempore State Bar Court Hearing Department judges
when a regular judge is unavailable to serve without delaying a proceeding. SB 1420 also allows the California Supreme
Court to appoint pro tempore State Bar Court Hearing Department judges.
Finally, SB 1420 requires the Bar to review its workload
standards to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of its
disciplinary activities, including but not limited to the State
Bar Court and the Client Security Fund, and provide guidance to the Bar and the legislature in allocating resources.
The standards must be used to reassess the numbers and classifications of staff required to conduct the activities of the
State Bar's disciplinary activities. The results of the studywhich must cover calendar years 1998, 1999, and 2000-
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signed AB 2069 on September 16, 2000 (Chapter 472, Statmust be submitted to the legislature by June 30, 2001 (see
MAJOR PROJECTS). Governor Davis signed this bill on
utes of 2000).
August 24, 2000 (Chapter 246, Statutes of 2000).
SB 1988 (Speier), as amended August 25, 2000, deals
with insurance fraud. As it relates to attorneys, SB 1988 makes
SB 1782 (Morrow), as amended June 29, 2000, states
the legislature's intent that the Supreme Court of California
engaging in insurance fraud grounds for disbarment or suspension of an attorney and requires the State Bar to investiadopt rules allowing admission to practice in California to
gate such fraud unless the district attorney objects to such an
attorneys licensed in other states without passing the Califorinvestigation. Governor Davis signed SB 1988 on September
nia Bar examination; and requests the Supreme Court to establish a task force to study the issue of reciprocity for Bar
28, 2000 (Chapter 867, Statutes of 2000).
admissions. The bill specifies that the task force should conAB 1042 (Cedillo). Existing law requires law students
sider all of the following factors: years of practice in other
attending unaccredited law schools to pass the so-called "Baby
states; admission to practice law in another state; specializaBar" examination after the first year, and precludes them from
tion of the attorney's practice in another state; the attorney's
receiving credit for the first year or subsequent years of study
intended scope of practice in California; the admission reuntil they have passed the examination. As enrolled August
30, 2000, AB 1042 would have, until January 1, 2003, requirements in the state(s) in which the attorney has been licensed to practice; reciprocity with and comity with other
quired a student attending an unaccredited law school to take
states; moral character requirements; disciplinary implicathe "Baby Bar," after which the student would be notified,
tions; and consumer protection (see MAJOR PROJECTS).
based on his/her score, of the probability of passing the genSB 1782 was signed by the Governor on August 24, 2000
eral Bar examination. It further would have provided that,
(Chapter 247, Statutes of 2000).
until January 1,2003, passing the "Baby Bar" is not a condiAB 2107 (Scott), as amended August 24, 2000, primation for receiving credit for law study or for eligibility to take
rily pertains to the marketing of Medicare supplemental and
the general Bar examination. As of January 1, 2003, the bill
would have repealed the "Baby Bar" requirement for students
long-term insurance policies to senior citizens, and clarifies
the definition of "financial abuse" for the purpose of the Elattending unaccredited law schools.
der Abuse and Dependent Civil Protection Act. As it relates
Following former Governor Wilson's lead on two simito the Bar, AB 2107 requires the State Bar to file an annual
lar bills during the 1990s [15:4 CRLR 250; 14:4 CRLR 215],
report to the legislature about financial services provided by
Governor Davis vetoed AB 1042 on September 25,2000, saylawyers to elders. The report must include the number of coming, "The Baby Bar was established in 1935 by the State Bar
to protect those individuals ill-suited for a legal career from
plaints filed and investigations initiated, the types of charges
made, and the number and nature of disciplinary actions taken
expending further time, money, and effort, and to provide
by the State Bar. The Governor signed AB 2107 on Septemothers with the opportunity to measure the quality of the eduber 13, 2000 (Chapter 442, Statutes of 2000).
cation from unaccredited law schools. The California Supreme
AB 2069 (Corbett), as amended August 18, 2000, reCourt has agreed that there is a legitimate state interest in
quires the State Bar to conduct a study concerning the legal
requiring this examination because the Baby Bar protects stuand professional responsibility issues that may arise as a redents by informing them about their ability to practice law,
sult of the relationship between an attorney and an insurer
and the results of the examination indicate to the student the
when an attorney is retained by the insurer to represent an
quality of the legal education the student is receiving. For
insured, and the attorney is subsequently retained to reprethese reasons, I cannot sign this bill."
sent'a party against another party insured by the insurer. The
AB 1858 (Romero), as amended August 18, 2000, enacts specific advertising requirements for State Bar members
Bar must submit a report on the study and any recommendawho practice in the areas of imtions to the legislature and the Supreme Court by July 1,2001. This
migration and naturalization law.
bill, sponsored by California De- AB 1858 (Romero), as ame nded August 18,2000, enacts This bill requires each member of
fense Counsel, is designed to ad- specific advertising reDqu irements for State Bar the State Bar to include in all address issues raised by the decision members who practice in the areas of immigration and vertisements offering to provide
in State FarmMutual Automobile naturalization law.
services relating to immigration
Insurance Co. v. Federal Insurand naturalization a statement that
ance Co., 72 Cal. App. 4th 1422 (1999), review denied Sept.
he/she is a member of the State Bar and is licensed to prac29, 1999. In this case, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held
tice law in California. Law firms or corporations advertising
that a law firm is disqualified from bringing an action against
such services are also required to include in these advertisean insurance company while representing a policyholder of
ments a statement that all legal services are provided by an
that same company in an unrelated insurance defense case.
active member of the State Bar or under the supervision of an
The court said that such representation is inconsistent with
active member of the State Bar. This bill further specifies
an attorney's duty of undivided loyalty under Rule 3-310 of
that those required statements be in the same language as the
the Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct. Governor Davis
advertisement. Advertisements in telephone and business diCaliforniaRegulatory Law Reporter 4 Volume 17, No. 2 (Winter 2001) * covers November 1999-April 2001
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rectories that state only the name, address, and telephone number of the entity, as well as Bar members employed by public
agencies or by nonprofit entities registered with the Secretary of State, are exempt from these requirements. AB 1858
makes violation of these provisions cause for discipline by
the State Bar.
Existing law regulates the practice of "immigration consultants," defined as persons who provide nonlegal assistance
or advice in an immigration matter. With certain exceptions,
this bill requires immigration consultants who print, display,
publish, distribute, or broadcast, or who cause to be printed,
displayed, published, distributed, or broadcasted, any advertisement for services as an immigration consultant within the
meaning of Business and Professions Code section 22441, to
include in that advertisement a clear and conspicuous statement that the immigration consultant is not an attorney. The
bill also increases the civil penalty for the unauthorized practice of law by immigration consultants from $10,000 to
$100,000. Governor Davis signed AB 1858 on September 24,
2000 (Chapter 674, Statutes of 2000).
AB 1761 (Brewer), as amended August 18, 2000, defines the term "paralegal" and specifies the qualifications for
practice as a paralegal. The bill also creates educational requirements for paralegals, and sets forth permissible paralegal activities. This legislation is intended to protect consumers from untrained and unqualified professionals who perform poor quality legal services.
New Business and Professions Code section 6450 defines "paralegal" as a person who contracts with or is employed by an attorney, law firm, corporation, governmental
agency, or other entity, who performs substantial specifically
delegated tasks under the direction and supervision of an active member of the State Bar or an attorney practicing law in
the California federal courts. The terms "paralegal," "legal
assistant," "attorney assistant," "freelance paralegal," "independent paralegal," and "contract paralegal," are synonymous
with "paralegal" for purposes of the new law. The new provisions do not apply to a "legal document assistant" or "unlawful detainer assistant" as defined in Business and Professions
Code section 6400. Paralegals employed by the State of California are specifically exempted from these rules.
Under AB 1761, a paralegal may not contract with or be
employed by a person other than an attorney to provide paralegal services. Tasks that may be performed by a paralegal
under the supervision of an attorney include case planning,
development, and management; legal research; interviewing
clients; fact gathering and retrieving information; drafting and
analyzing legal documents; and collecting, compiling, and
utilizing technical information to make an independent decision and recommendation to the supervising attorney. A paralegal may also represent a client before state or federal administrative agencies if such representation is allowed by
agency statute or regulation.
A paralegal may not provide legal advice, represent a
client in court, or otherwise engage in conduct that consti-

tutes the unauthorized practice of law. For example, a paralegal may not select, explain, draft, or recommend the use of
any legal document to or for any person other than the supervising attorney. The paralegal may also not act as a runner or
capper to solicit clients for an attorney.
This bill requires a paralegal to have either (1) a certificate of completion or a degree from an approved paralegal
program or postsecondary institution; (2) a bachelor's degree
combined with one year of legal experience under the supervision of a qualified attorney; or (3) a high school diploma or
GED and three years of supervised legal experience. The third
option will sunset in 2003. The supervising attorney must be
an active member of the State Bar for at least three years or
have practiced in California federal courts for three years.
AB 1761 also requires paralegals to complete four hours
of continuing education in legal ethics every four years and
four hours in either general law or a specialized area of law
every two years. The courses must meet the same requirements as attorney MCLE. The bill requires the supervising
attorney to certify completion of the continuing education
requirements and requires the paralegal to keep a record of
the certification.
The bill also makes it unlawful for an individual to hold
him/herself out as a paralegal on any advertisement, letterhead,
business card, sign, or elsewhere unless he/she meets the educational requirements and works under the supervision of a
qualified attorney. The business card of a paralegal must include the name of the law firm employing the paralegal or a
statement that the paralegal is employed by or contracting with
a licensed attorney. Violation of the unlawful activities rules or
the advertising rules in this bill is an infraction punishable by a
fine of up to $2,500 as to each consumer to whom a violation
occurs. Subsequent violations are misdemeanors punishable
by a fine of up to $2,500 or imprisonment of up to one year.
Further, the attorney who uses the services of a paralegal is
liable for any harm caused as a result of the paralegal's negligence, misconduct, or violation of the statute governing paralegals. Governor Davis signed AB 1761 on September 13,2000
(Chapter 439, Statutes of 2000).
AB 2810 (Pacheco), as amended August 10, 2000, clarifies the bonding requirements for legal document assistants
(LDAs) and unlawful detainer assistants (UDAs). The bill
requires LDAs and UDAs to post a single bond of $25,000 in
favor of the State of California for the benefit of any person
who is harmed as a result of a violation of the UDA or LDA
law. The bond will indicate the name of the county in which
it is filed, but is applicable statewide. This bill clarifies existing law by requiring an LDA or UDA to register in any county
in which he/she performs acts for which registration is required (deemed secondary registration). Any registration in a
county other than the county of the person's place of business is required to state the person's principal place of business and provide proof that the registrant has satisfied the
bonding requirement. The Governor signed AB 2810 on September 8, 2000 (Chapter 386, Statutes of 2000).
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SB 1927 (Haynes), as amended August 7, 2000, would
have reduced the amount of the bond required of LDAs who
limit their practice solely to assisting parties in small claims
court in Riverside County from $25,000 to $5,000. Governor
Davis vetoed this bill on September 7, 2000. In his veto message, the Governor said: "There has been no evidence that
the current registration requirement is overly burdensome or
that it is limiting the availability of legal assistants. In addition, consumers who use small claims court often are the ones
most in need of the protection that registration and bonding
provide. There is nothing unique to Riverside County that
would warrant that consumers who live there should not receive the same level of protection as consumers elsewhere in
the state."

2001 LEGISLATION
SB 352 (Kuehl), as amended April 30, 2001, is a twoyear Bar dues bill applicable to 2002 and 2003. SB 352 would
decrease the Bar's 2001 maximum basic membership fee from
$318 to $310, and require the Bar to permit members to deduct $5 per year if they do not wish to support Bar lobbying
activities that exceed the Keller mandate (see MAJOR
PROJECTS). SB 352 would also continue to authorize the
Bar to charge annual fees of $40 for its Client Security Fund,
$10 for its building fund, $25 for disciplinary activities, and
$ 10 for the new attorney diversion program contained in SB
479 (Burton), to which SB 352 is joined (see below). The bill
would also amend Business and Professions Code section
6068(f) to delete a provision imposing upon an attorney the
duty to "abstain from having an offensive personality," as
that term has been invalidated as "void for vagueness" by the
U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. [S. Jud]
SB 479 (Burton), as amended April 30,2001, would require the Bar to establish and administer a diversion and rehabilitation assistance program for attorneys with substance
abuse problems or mental illness (see MAJOR PROJECTS).
The program, which would be overseen by a 12-member committee, would monitor chemically dependent and/or mentally
ill attorneys and route them to appropriate treatment, rehabilitation, and recovery services. The bill would authorize the
Bar to charge an annual fee of up to $10 to each member of
the State Bar to finance the program. The proposed diversion
program is modeled after the Medical Board of California's
Diversion Program for physicians with substance abuse problems and/or mental illness.
A Senate committee analysis of SB 479 quotes a February 2001 Senate Office of Research report as saying that
"[s]ubstance abuse and mental illnesses are factors in a significant share of the malpractice and misconduct charges filed
against members of the legal profession. The ABA's Commission on Lawyer Assistance Programs recently reported that
'a majority of [lawyer] disciplinary problems involve chemical dependency or emotional stress."' Further, an ABA commission estimated that about 15-18% of the nation's lawyers
abuse alcohol or drugs, compared to only 10% of the general

population; another 10% reportedly suffer from some form
of psychological distress. [S. Jud]
SB 817 (Johnson), as introduced February 23, 2001,
is a Bar-sponsored bill that would revise one pathway of the
educational requirements for admission to the Bar. That pathway requires a person, in addition to meeting other requirements, to have graduated from an accredited law school requiring three years of full-time study, or four years of
part-time study in order to be eligible to take the Bar exam.
This bill would revise that requirement to instead require
the person to earn a law degree from an accredited law
school. According to the Bar, the change is intended to focus the statute on the fact that it is graduation from an accredited law school, not the number of years attended, that
is the key to eligibility to take the Bar exam under this pathway.
SB 817 would also shorten by 15 days the time period in
which a late application to take the Bar exam must be filed;
and would also permit an out-of-state attorney to take the
Attorney's Bar Exam instead of the general Bar exam when
he/she has been licensed for four years in another United States
jurisdiction, counting from the first day of the examination
(instead of from the date of the application). This bill would
except the Multistate Bar Examination portion of the Bar
examination from provisions allowing a person who has failed
the Bar examination to inspect his/her examination papers
and the grading of the papers. [S. Jud]
AB 363 (Steinberg), as amended April 26, 2001, would
enact the Public Agency Attorney Accountability Act. The
Act would make a finding by the legislature of the competing
obligations of public agency attorneys to protect the interests
of the public and to protect the confidences of their client,
and a declaration that a rule of professional conduct should
be adopted to clarify the circumstances under which public
agency attorneys may act to protect the public when doing so
may disclose client confidences.
An April 30, 2001 Assembly committee report quotes
the author as stating, "Public agency attorneys face sometimes competing obligations not faced in the private sector:
the concomitant obligations to protect both the public interest and the confidentiality of client confidences. This issue
was dramatically highlighted last year in the case of Department of Insurance attorney Cindy Ossias, who courageously
came forward to the Legislature to disclose wrongdoing on
the part of former Commissioner Chuck Quackenbush and
other agency employees that ultimately helped lead to the
resignation of Mr. Quackenbush. Ms. Ossias was offered protection from criminal prosecution for her disclosures, but she
was temporarily relieved of her job at the Department and
risked potentially serious discipline by the State Bar, including the loss of her livelihood. Although the State Bar ultimately exonerated Ms. Ossias, and Ms. Ossias was reinstated
to her position at the Department of Insurance, her case underscores the need for the State Bar to quickly clarify in the
California Rules of Professional Conduct the types of cir-
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cumstances under which an attorney can seek to protect the
never officially formed. This bill would abolish the CLC and
public interest even if that mean disclosing client confidences.
its section 384 authorization to receive unpaid residuals from
Once these Rules become clear on this important issue, pubclass action litigation, and instead provide that unpaid residulic agency attorneys in California will no longer have to risk
als from class action litigation will be paid either to nonprofit
their Bar licenses, and even their livelihoods, to protect the
organizations to support projects beneficial to the class or to
public from serious government misconduct" (see agency
promote the law consistent with the objectives of the litigareport on DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE for further intion, or to child advocacy programs or nonprofit legal serformation). [A. Jud]
vices programs. [S. Jud]
AB 935 (Hertzberg), as amended April 16, 2001, would
AB 830 (Cohn), as amended March 27, 2001, would require the Department of Aging to establish a task force to
create the Public Interest Attorney Loan Repayment Program
study and make recommendations to the legislature on issues
to provide loan repayment assistance, not to exceed $15,000
per year, for licensed attorneys who practice or agree to pracrelating to legal services for seniors. [A. Appr]
AB 913 (Steinberg), as introduced February 23, 2001,
tice in public interest areas of the law. The program would be
administered by the state Student Aid Commission (SAC).
is a "spot bill" stating legislative intent that the provision of
pro bono legal services is the professional responsibility of
AB 935 would require that SAC create an advisory committee, to include one representative from the State Bar, one repCalifornia attorneys as an integral part of the privilege of pracresentative from the California Commission on Access to
ticing law in this state. The bill makes findings that in recent
years, many law firms in California have been fortunate to
Justice, one representative with at least ten years experience
managing a nonprofit legal services organization, and not
experience a robust increase in average attorney income; howmore than three representatives from California law schools,
ever, during the same time period, there has regrettably been
a decline in the average number of pro bono services being
to guide SAC in adopting regulations to administer the program, publicizing the program, selecting eligible participants,
rendered by attorneys in this state. Without legislative action
and other duties. The bill would create the Public Interest
to bolster pro bono activities, there is a serious risk that the
provision of critical pro bono legal services will continue to
Attorney Loan Repayment Endowment Account, which would
consist of funds appropriated by the legislature for the prosubstantially decrease. [A. Jud]
AB 1083 (Bates), as amended April 25, 2001, would
gram, private contributions to the program, and receipts from
clarify provisions enacted in AB 1761 (Brewer) (see 2000
participant repayments. The bill would require each recipient
LEGISLATION). This bill would require that a person hold
to practice for one year in a public interest area of the law for
him/herself out as a paralegal in order to be considered a paraeach year of loan repayment received, and would restrict
legal (such that the person is required to meet AB 1761's edugrants to a maximum of five years per participant. At this
writing, the bill appropriates no funds from the state into the
cation and training requirements), and would exclude persons performing certain law-related tasks or jobs from the
endowment account. [A. Appr]
definition of "paralegal" if they are employed by a lawyer or
SB 1194 (Romero), as amended April 30, 2001, would
law firm and work under the direction and supervision of a
permit those injured by persons practicing without a license
member of the State Bar. [A. Jud]
to be awarded damages and other relief in an action brought
by the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city attorney
acting as a public prosecutor. This bill would also make it
LITIGATION
unlawful for a person to disseminate a statement indicating
During 2000-01, the California Supreme Court decided
three cases challenging the constitutionality of alleged legislathat he/she is acting as an immigration consultant without
tive incursion into the Court's sacred territory-the State Bar's
having filed the required $50,000 bond with the Secretary of
attorney discipline system. Despite the Court's recent affirmaState. [S. Jud]
SB 1218 (Romero), as amended April 30, 2001, would
tion of its "inherent constitutional authority over the discipline
repeal Business and Professions Code section 6034, which
of licensed attorneys in this state" in In Re Attorney Discipline
created the "California Legal Corps" (CLC) as an arm of the
System, 19 Cal. 4th 582 (1998) [16:1 CRLR 193-94], the Court
upheld the legislature's actions in
State Bar in 1993; section 6034
all three cases.
authorizes the CLC to receive un9
the California Supreme
In the first case, In Re Mapaid residues from class action In tin a 5-2 d
on- iphV,
U
upheld the constitutionality son HarryRose V, 22 Cal. 4th 430
lawsuits under Code of Civil Proourinia
legislativ
y-prescribed structural (Mar. 6,2000), the California Sucedure section 384 and award
(
preme Court-in a 5-2 deciC
Bar
State
the
to
changes
them to nonprofit organizations
sion - upheld the constitutionality
engaged in preventive law
projects, alternative dispute resolution efforts, legal support
of significant legislatively-prescribed structural changes to
for victims of disasters, and other activities designed to help
the State Bar Court. Attorney Mason Harry Rose V- an attorney who suffered at least three disciplinary suspensions
improve access to justice for all Californians. [13:4 CRLR
between 1989 and 1995, and who was subsequently recom216-17] Despite much publicity by the Bar, the CLC was
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the burden of establishing error. When no petition is filed,
mended for disbarment by a State Bar Court hearing judge
the decision or order of the State Bar Court is final and enand the Review Department-challenged the validity of the
forceable. When a petition is filed, Supreme Court review of
post-1989 State Bar Court, and particularly the Supreme
the case is discretionary. SB 1498 amended Business and ProCourt's "finality rules" which enable it to summarily deny an
fessions Code section 6087, which generally reserves to the
attorney's petition for review of a disbarment recommendaCalifornia Supreme Court all authority to disbar or discipline
tion of the State Bar Court.
attorneys in California, to provide that "[n]otwithstanding any
Prior to 1989, the State Bar's disciplinary system was
other provision of law, the Supreme Court may by rule auoperated primarily with the assistance of volunteer attorneys
thorize the State Bar to take any action otherwise reserved to
who acted as referees and made recommendations to the Board
the Supreme Court in any matter arising under this chapter or
of Governors; the Board, in turn, made disciplinary recominitiated by the Supreme Court; provided, however, that any
mendations to the California Supreme Court. The Court rousuch action by the State Bar shall be reviewable by the Sutinely granted petitions for review of recommendations of
preme Court pursuant to such rules as the Supreme Court
disbarment or suspension, and issued written opinions folmay prescribe." Rule 954(a) of the California Rules of Court,
lowing briefing and oral argument. In fact, the Court-which
approved by the Supreme Court in 1991, sets forth the cirexpressed public dissatisfaction with the quality of State Bar
cumstances under which the Supreme Court will grant redisciplinary decisionmaking in Maltaman v.State Bar,43 Cal.
view. In the event the Supreme Court denies review, Rule
3d 924 (1987)-often reviewed and modified recommenda954(b) provides that the denial "shall constitute a final juditions forwarded by the State Bar without the filing of any
cial determination on the merits and the recommendation of
petition for review. [7:3 CRLR 1]
the State Bar Court shall be filed as an order of the Supreme
Effective January 1, 1989, however, the provisions of
Court." [11:2 CRLR 180; 11:1 CRLR 148]
SB 1498 (Presley) (Chapter 1159, Statutes of 1988) became
As noted above, the Review Department recommended
effective. Among many other things, SB 1498 (Presley)disbarment of attorney Rose, who
drafted by Professor Robert C.
sought review of that recommenFellmeth during his five-year tenJrt's summary denial deprived dation in the California Supreme
ure as State Bar Discipline Moni- Rose argued that the CoL
Court. The Supreme Court sumss and of his constitutional
tor pursuant to now-repealed Busi- him of procedural due prc aces
inat
tion of whether he should marily denied Rose's petition for
ness and Professions Code section right to a judicial determ
review without oral argument or
6086.9-did away with the use of be disbarred.
a written decision explaining the
volunteers to investigate, prosreasons
for
its
denial.
Rose
argued that the Court's summary
ecute, and hear attorney discipline cases, and replaced the
volunteer system with professional investigators, professional
denial deprived him of procedural due process and of his constitutional right to a judicial determination of whether he
prosecutors, and a professional State Bar Court that is not
appointed or controlled by the attorney-dominated Board of
should be disbarred. Specifically, Rose claimed that (1) the
procedural scheme violates his right to de novo review by an
Governors. Under the 1988 legislation, all State Bar Court
Article VI court of the State Bar Court's determination of
judges were appointed directly by the California Supreme
questions of law and fact; (2) a summary denial of review
a
Hearing
Department,
Court. The State Bar Court consists of
violates Article VI, section 14 of the California Constitution,
whose full-time judges preside over individual evidentiary
which provides that decisions of the Supreme Court that dehearings in State Bar attorney discipline matters and render
written decisions recommending whether the respondent attermine "causes" must be in writing with reasons stated; and
torney should be disciplined. Any disciplinary decision is re(3) the procedure violates Article VI, section 2 of the Califorviewable by the State Bar Court Review Department at the
nia Constitution, which -according to Rose -confers a right
request of the attorney or the State Bar. In Review Departto oral argument.
Rose first argued that he is entitled to judicial review of
ment proceedings, matters are fully briefed, the parties are
the State Bar's administrative decision by a court vested with
given an opportunity for oral argument, and the Review De"judicial power" under Article VI, section 1 of the California
partment issues a written opinion recommending discipline.
Constitution. Courts authorized to exercise "judicial power"
Judicial review of a State Bar Court decision is governed
include the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts,
by Business and Professions Code section 6081 et seq. and
and municipal courts; Article VI, section 1 does not include
by Rule 950 et seq. of the California Rules of Court (the sothe State Bar Court. In rejecting this argument that the legiscalled "finality rules"). Under these laws, any recommendalature has improperly invested the State Bar Court with "jution of suspension or disbarment must be transmitted, along
with the accompanying record, to the California Supreme
dicial power" by rendering its decisions final upon the Supreme Court's denial of a petition for review, the Court reitCourt after the State Bar Court's decision becomes final. An
erated that-in Business and Professions Code section 6087aggrieved attorney may file a petition to review, reverse, or
the legislature has expressly reserved to the Supreme Court
modify such a State Bar Court decision with the Supreme
(and not the State Bar Court) the "judicial power" over attorCourt within 60 days of its issuance, and the petitioner has
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sion is at stake, only attorneys are denied their day in court."
ney discipline. The State Bar Court is simply an administraSimilarly, Justice Brown argued that "attorneys penalized for
tive arm of the Supreme Court which makes recommendaprofessional misconduct get less in the way of genuine judithe
"judicial
of
tions to the Supreme Court; it exercises none
cial review of discipline than licensed nonattorneys do." In a
depower" of the Supreme Court. When the Supreme Court
footnote, the majority responded to their comments by saynies a petition for review, it is not the State Bar Court's recing that "attorneys are the only professional licensees who,
is
ommendation that becomes "final"; what becomes "final"
as a matter of right in every case, can obtain judicial review
the Supreme Court's order denying the petition for review
on the merits by the highest appellate court in the state, beas
its
and adopting the State Bar Court's recommendation
fore their license can be revoked or suspended."
own, and that decision is guided by the criteria the Supreme
In the second case, Obrien v. Jones,23 Cal. 4th 40 (June
denial
Court has established for itself in Rule 954(a). "[O]ur
a four-member majority of the California Supreme
1,
2000),
deof a petition for review of a State Bar Court disciplinary
upheld
provisions of SB 143 (Burton) (Chapter 221,
Court
purcision is a final judicial determination on the merits for
that permit elected officials to appoint some
of
1999)
Statutes
res
poses of establishing federal jurisdiction and
Court's
hearing judges and eliminate a nonState
Bar
of
the
deny
judicata. ...[T]he circumstance that we may summarily
Bar Court's Review Department.
the
State
judge
from
lawyer
an
such a petition does not preclude an attorney from having
bill that changed the compowas
a
controversial
SB
143
in
this
claims
adequate opportunity to litigate federal
the way its judges are apCourt
and
State
Bar
sition
of
the
Bar
of
State
court... .The procedural scheme for our review
As noted above, the 1988
PROJECTS).
(see
MAJOR
pointed
judiwith
Bar
Court
Court decisions does not invest the State
each of its judges
required
Bar
Court
the
State
creating
statute
an
to
of
the
right
cial power, nor does it deprive an attorney
Court. As
Supreme
California
by
the
directly
to
be
appointed
of
whether
VI
court,
independent determination, by an article
implemented during the 1990s, the State Bar Court consisted
he or she should be disbarred or suspended."
of a hearing panel of five judges and a three-judge Review
The Supreme Court also rejected Rose's contention unDepartment consisting of the Presiding Judge of the State Bar
which
Constitution,
of
the
California
section
14
Article
VI,
der
Court, one attorney judge, and one non-attorney judge; each
...that
deterCourt
Supreme
of
the
provides that "[d]ecisions
judge was appointed by the California Supreme Court upon
mine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated." Here,
the nomination of that court's Applicant Evaluation and Nomithe Supreme Court found that its denial of a petition for renation Committee. Effective November 1,2000, SB 143 perview of the State Bar Court's recommendation of disbarment
mits the Supreme Court to appoint only two of the five hearthe
meaning
within
"cause"
a
decide
not
does
or suspension
ing judges; the remaining three
of this provision because, historically, the term "cause" has been
are appointed by the Govar gued that the California judges
ernor, Senate Rules Committee,
limited to criminal actions and Specifically, petitioners
iary aty"
State and Assembly Speaker. SB 143
ovdallered
tht
civil suits-not specialized pro- Surem ort hscpie
te andualleged tht the also eliminates the non-lawyer
sy
Bar's attorney discipline est the Supreme Court of
ceedings such as attorney discidive
pline matters. The Supreme Court legislature's attempt to
position on the Review
apipoint all State Bar Court judge
Department and replaces it with
its power to select and
similarly rejected Rose's contenmin ate the lay judge position an attorney judge position. 117:1
tion that Article VI, section 2 of hearing judges and to eli violates the separation ofCLR2]
nt v
CRLR 209]
the California Constitution con- inte Revie
Three sitting State Bar Court
fers a right to oral argument prior powers doctrine.
judges whose terms were set to
to issuance of the order.
expire on November 1, 2000-James Obrien, H. Kenneth
Based upon the foregoing rulings, the Supreme Court
Norian (the Review Department's non-lawyer judge), and
rejected Rose's contention that "because the attorney receives
Nancy R. Lonsdale-filed suit in January 2000, challenging
no indication that the merits have ever been considered by
SB 143 as violative of the separation of powers provision of
judicial minds," its summary denial of his petition for review
the California Constitution. Specifically, petitioners argued
fails to afford him procedural due process as guaranteed by
that the California Supreme Court has "plenary authority"
the U.S. Constitution. In the words of the Court, "our sumover the State Bar's attorney discipline system and alleged
mary denial of such a petition for review necessarily includes
that the legislature's attempt to divest the Supreme Court of
a judicial determination on the merits (rule 954(b)), includits power to select and appoint all State Bar Court hearing
ing an independent evaluation of the facts and the law."
judges and to eliminate the lay judge position in the Review
Justices Joyce Kennard and Janice Rogers Brown disDepartment violates the separation of powers doctrine. In
sented. Comparing the Bar's attorney discipline system to
support of petitioners, former State Bar Discipline Monitor
the Administrative Procedure Act that governs discipline of
Robert C. Fellmeth filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that
that
argued
Kennard
Justice
professionals,
other regulated
the appointment and (more importantly) reappointment of
"[a]ttorneys are the only persons whose state occupational
State Bar Court judges by elected officials would impermisheara
judicial
without
or
suspended
licenses can be revoked
sibly politicize what should be a purely judicial process and
or
profesa
trade
ing. When the right to continue practicing
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not continue to repose confidence in and to rely upon a State
cause judges seeking reappointment to conform their decisions to the will of their appointing authorities.
Bar Court in which some hearing judges are appointed by the
Rejecting the arguments of petitioners and Professor
executive and legislative branches pursuant to section 6079.1."
In conjunction with its ruling, the majority amended secFellmeth, the four-member majority held that the disputed
tion 961 of the California Rules of Court, effective July 1,
provision of SB 143, as codified at Business and Professions
2000, to provide for staggered terms of the hearing judges to
Code section 6079.1(a), does not violate the separation of
be appointed effective November
powers provision of the state Con1,
lJoyce
2000; and abrogated one prostitution. Although repeatedly afers,.Justice ofce Kennard vision of SB 143 by announcing
firming the Supreme Court's "ex- Writing for two dissent
epaaration of powers doctrine that it would continue to use its
pressly reserved, primary, inher- anoted that the frams ;of the U.S. Constitution
ers
ent authority over [attorney] ad- deliberately refused to pe
own appointed Applicant Evalurmi
mission and discipline," the mai
ranhes.appi
ation and Nomination Committee
exe
to screen and evaluate all applijority noted that "the separation of
cants for the State Bar Court.
powers principle does not comWriting for two dissenters, Justice Joyce Kennard traced
mand 'a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another,"' and acknowledged that "in the
the origins of the separation of powers doctrine and noted
that the framers of the U.S. Constitution deliberately refused
field of attorney-client conduct, we recognize that the judiciary and the Legislature are in some sense partners in reguto permit Congress to appoint any officers of the judicial or
lation." Citing to several instances of the Supreme Court's
executive branches. According to Justice Kennard, "[ilt is
worth noting that, consistent with the federal Constitution's
refusal to implement express legislative command in the area
of attorney discipline, the majority reiterated that "this court
limitations on Congress's role in the appointment and removal
retains ultimate control over all the admission and disciplinof executive and judicial branch officers, the California Conary functions of the State Bar Court," but found that allowing
stitution gives the Legislature no role at all in the appointexecutive and legislative branch officials to appoint some of
ment of judges." Justice Kennard wrote that "interbranch
the Hearing Department judges does not materially impair
appointments ...raise serious separation of powers
that inherent and ultimate power because (1) the requirements
concerns, ...must be carefully scrutinized and should be perfor legislative and executive branch appointment of Hearing
mitted only if there exists either a special justification for the
Department judges are almost identical to the requirements
interbranch appointing mechanism or particular safeguards
specified in Supreme Court rules, and (2) the legislative and
to protect the appointee from extrabranch influence after apexecutive branches are permitted to appoint only Hearing Depointment. Because here the proponents of the challenged
partment judges, while the Supreme Court retains ultimate
law have shown neither a special justification nor particular
authority to appoint the Review Department judges who insafeguards, the challenged law is invalid."
dependently review appeals from hearing judge decisions.
Leading off with the statement "[t]he wanton pursuit of
Further, the majority rejected one provision of SB 143
power is not a new problem," Justice Janice Rogers Brown
that purports to authorize the Board of Governors to screen
wrote her own dissent. Justice Brown quoted the U.S. Suand rate all applicants for hearing
preme Court for the proposition
judge positions, and instead reaf- Justice Brown conclu
de d that "the legislation that "[a] Judiciary free from confirmed its existing requirement examined here shows di
srespect for this court as a trol by the Executive and the Legthat all applicants for State Bar coordinatebranchofgove
mrnent. The majority's abject islature is essential if there is a
Court judge positions be screened acceptance of such legi tive impudence goes far right to have claims decided by
slation. This is abdication."
judges who are free from potenand evaluated by its own Appli- beyond comity and coop
erat______Thsisabdcation."
tial domination by other branches
cant Evaluation and Nomination
Committee; thus, legislative and
of Government." Justice Brown
executive branch appointing authorities are limited to appointnoted that Professor Fellmeth, in a 1988 progress report to
ing applicants found qualified by the Supreme Court's screenthe legislature on the State Bar Discipline Monitor project,
ing body. The majority stated: "In light of the requirement
characterized legislative and executive branch involvement
that an applicant must be found qualified by the Applicant
in the State Bar's attorney disciplinary function in California
Evaluation and Nomination Committee or by this court beas "perhaps...unprecedented," in light of the fact that "in 33
fore he or she may be appointed as a State Bar Court hearing
states, the state supreme court appoints not only the adjudijudge, and the broad authority of the Review Department (all
cators, but also the commission overseeing the entire disciof whose members we appoint) to evaluate and to accept or
plinary system operation, including investigations and trial
reject independently the findings and recommendations of
counsel....Perhaps, more importantly, this is a judicial posihearing judges, to order additional evidentiary proceedings,
tion and one unique to the very special jurisdiction of the
and to render the State Bar Court's ultimate findings and recSupreme Court." Justice Brown concluded that "[t]he legisommendations, we presently discern no reason why we may
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ordinate branch of government. T1he majority's abject accepprivate act unrelated to the practice of law." In rejecting this
tance of such legislative impuden ce goes far beyond comity
argument, Justice Kennard wrote for a unanimous court:
and cooperation. This is abdicatio n."
"Petitioner's attempt to commit a lewd or lascivious act on a
And finally, on March 1, 200 1 in In re Paguirigan,25
child who was 14 or 15 years old and at least 10 years younger
Cal. 4th 1 (2001), the California Su preme Court unanimously
than himself was such a serious breach of the duties of reupheld a Review Department deciision recommending sumspect and care that all adults owe to all children, and it showed
mary disbarment of Cristeta Paguiirigan under Business and
such a flagrant disrespect for the law and for societal norms,
Professions Code section 6102(c) That statute requires the
that continuation of petitioner's State Bar membership would
summary disbarment of an attorney convicted of a felony that
be likely to undermine public confidence in and respect for
involves moral turpitude or where
the legal profession. Therefore,
we
with the
Bar Court
an element of the offense is the
of a
convicted
wasState
petitioner
thatagree
the
After a flurry of litigation activity during 1999-2001,
specific intent to deceive, defraud,
tupitde,
mal
feloyiong
an
reaching
decade-long Brosterhous saga is finally
steal, or make or suborn a false
felony involving moral turpitude,
end.
statement. Paguirigan pled no
and we accept the State Bar
contest to one count of forgery
Court's recommendation that he
after forging the signature of a wit:ness in a civil action. Her
be summarily disbarred under Business and Professions Code
conviction falls squarely with the summary disbarment statsection 6102, subdivision (c)."
ute; and the Review Department re commended summary disAfter a flurry of litigation activity during 1999-2001,
barment. Paguirigan petitioned the California Supreme Court
the decade-long Brosterhoussaga is finally reaching an end.
for review, arguing that-as interp'reted by the Bar-section
In August 1999 in Brosterhous v. State Bar of California,
No. 95AS03901, Sacramento County Superior Court Judge
6102(c) usurps the plenary autho rity of the California Supreme Court over attorney discipli[ne because it does not perMorrison C. England Jr. ruled that the Bar illegally spent its
mit a respondent to present or the court to consider evidence
members' mandatory licensing fees on improper political and
ideological activities in 1989. Brosterhousarose from the U.S.
of mitigating factors. [17:1 CRLR 2141
Following its decision in Obrien (see above),the Supreme
Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Keller v. State Bar,
496 U.S. 1 (1990), in which the Court struck down as violaCourt reaffirmed its "primary auth ority over the discipline of
attorneys" and found that "the lelgislature's enactment of a
tive of the first amendment the Bar's use of mandatory memstatute relating to attorney disciplirne does not in and of itself
bership fees for ideological or political purposes unrelated to
the "regulation of the legal profession or improving the qualinfringe on this court's inherent aiuthority in this area." The
ity of legal services." In response to Keller, the Bar adopted
Court noted that the legislature has provided for summary
procedures under which it analyzes and categorizes its exdisbarment in statutes dating bac k to 1872, found that the
penses as "chargeable" or "nonchargeable," and offers all Bar
summary disbarment statute does iot conflict with judicially
adopted rules, and stated that "[t iraditionally, we have remembers an opportunity to decline to pay for the nonchargeable portion (the so-called "Hudson deduction"). In 1992, the
spected the Legislature's reasonab le regulation of the pracBrosterhous plaintiffs challenged the Bar's 1991 calculation
tice of law by providing, among c)ther things, for summary
of its chargeable vs. nonchargeable expenses during 1989;
disbarment under certain circumsta nces."Citingcaselaw from
1922, the Supreme Court also rejec ted Paguirigan's argument
whereas the Bar calculated its nonchargeable expenses at $3
that the summary disbarment stat ute is "fundamentally unper lawyer, plaintiffs alleged that the Bar's calculations failed
fair" because it does not give the attorney an opportunity to
to include numerous nonchargeable activities and argued that
their Hudson deduction for that year should have been $87
be heard; the court held that Paguir igan was afforded full due
per lawyer. In his "phase one" ruling on liability only, Judge
process in the criminal proceeding and found that she must
England ruled that numerous Bar activities classified as
be deemed to have known that one result of her conviction of
"chargeable" to all Bar members should have been classified
that particular crime would be disbbarment.
as "nonchargeable," and announced his intent to proceed to
In a similar case, In re Lesansky, 25 Cal. 4th 11 (2001),
"phase two" regarding damages. [17:1 CRLR 211-12]
the California Supreme Court reje cted a different challenge
On December 24, 1999, the Bar filed an unusual midto Business and Professions Code section 6102, the summary
disbarment statute. Attorney Stuart K. Lesansky pled no contrial petition for writ of mandate in the Third District Court
of Appeal, asking the appellate court to reverse Judge
test to one count of an attempted 1lewd act on a child. After
receiving briefs from both sides buit without holding oral arEngland's phase one decision. On January 14, 2000, the
Third District denied the State Bar's petition, No. C034486,
gument, the Review Department d etermined that Lesansky's
saying that the Bar would have an adequate remedy at law
conviction necessarily involves mo ral turpitude and thus falls
by appeal from the final judgment. The case then returned
within the summary disbarment staitute. Lesansky petitioned
to Judge England, who-pursuant to the parties' stipulafor review, arguing that the summar disbarment statute should
tion-ruled in July 2000 that the 43 State Bar members who
apply only if the underlying offensse demonstrates unfitness
to practice law and that his convic tion concerned "a wholly
challenged the Bar's calculations are due an additional $10
CaliforniaRegulatory Law Reporter + Volume 17, No. 2 (Winter 2001) + covers November 1999-April 2001
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each, plus interest. Significantly, Judge England also ruled
that plaintiffs are entitled to costs and attorneys' fees. Although the Bar initially appealed this ruling, the Board of
Governors voted to withdraw its notice of appeal during a
closed session at its January 6, 2001 meeting. According to
State Bar President Palmer Brown Madden, "The ultimate
verdict in this case was of such a limited scope that the Board
has decided an appeal is unnecessary. This case was about
the way the Bar was ten years ago. We're a different Bar
today."
On March 4, 2001, plaintiffs filed their motion for attorneys' fees, seeking a total award of $2.36 million based on
the complexity and importance of the case and what they claim
was the Bar's bad faith and delay in defending it. At this writing, Judge England is scheduled to hold a hearing on plaintiffs' motion on May 11, 200 1.
On February 11, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court declined
to review the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' September 1999 dismissal of Morrow, et al. v. State Bar of California, 188 F.3d 1174, another challenge to the Bar's political
activities. In Morrow, the Ninth Circuit held that it is constitutional to compel attorneys to pay dues to a unified bar that
engages in political activities so long as dissenting members
are not compelled to fund those activities with mandatory
dues and mandatory bar membership does not impede dissenting members from expressing their own views and/or disagreeing with the view of the bar. [17:1 CRLR 212]
Conservative legal group's continue their attacks on Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA) programs, which
have been created in almost every state (including California) to fund legal services for the indigent. Under California's
IOLTA law (Business and Professions Code section 6210 et
seq.), lawyers are required to deposit client retainers into special interest-bearing checking accounts; banks then transfer
interest earned on these accounts to the State Bar's Legal
Services Trust Fund, which in turn awards it to qualified legal services organizations to provide legal services to indigent

2000), that the Texas IOLTA program does not qualify as "confiscatory regulation" of client property because there is neither a compensable loss nor a taking. According to Judge
Nowlin, absent the IOLTA program and its creation of a
"unique class of revenue," there would be no interest to confiscate, such that the client whose funds are being held in the
checking account cannot show an identifiable compensable
loss. At this writing, WLF's appeal of Judge Nowlin's decision is pending before the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, WLF challenged the state of
Washington's similar IOLTA program which was created by
the Washington Supreme Court in 1984; under that state's
law, the interest is transferred to the Legal Foundation of
Washington, a charitable organization established by the
Washington Supreme Court. Again alleging that IOLTA works
an unconstitutional taking of client funds, WLF lost in the
district court and appealed to the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Phillips v. WLF (see above), the Ninth Circuit held in
Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of
Washington, 236 F.3d 1097 (Jan. 10, 2001), that the interest
generated by IOLTA accounts is the property of the clients
and customers whose money is deposited into the accounts,
such that the fifth amendment's takings clause applies. The
Ninth Circuit concluded: "IOLTA programs spread rapidly
because they were an exceedingly intelligent idea. Money
that lawyers deposited in bank trust accounts always produced
earnings, but before IOLTA, the clients who owned the money
did not receive any of the earnings that their money produced.
IOLTA extracted the earnings from the banks and gave it to
charities, largely to fund legal services for the poor. That is a
very worthy purpose. But as Phillipsreminds us, the interest
belongs to the clients. It does not belong to the banks, or the
lawyers, or the escrow companies, or the state of Washington. If the clients' money is to be taken by the State of Washington for the worthy public pur-

pose of funding legal services for
indigents or anything else, then
the state of Washington has to pay
just compensation for the taking.
That serves the purpose of impos-

lazquez, the U.S. Supreme
people. In Phillips v. Washington In Legal Services Corp. v LIJ
rictions on arguments that
res
federal
invalidated
Court
156
U.S.
524
Legal Foundation,
rough the Legal Services
t
funded
are
who
attorneys
Court
Supreme
(1998), the U.S.
make
on behalf of clients
to
allowed
are
Corporation
Legal
analyzed the Washington
claims.
welfare
pursuing
in
to
challenge
Foundation's (WLF)
ing the costs on society as a whole
a similar IOLTA program created
for worthwhile social programs,
rather than on the individuals who have the misfortune to be
by the Texas State Bar, and concluded that the interest earned
on client funds held in IOLTA accounts is the "private propstanding where the cost first falls." The Ninth Circuit reerty" of the client for purposes of the takings clause of the
manded the case for determination of the amount of compenfifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Court remanded
sation required (if any). At this writing, the Legal Foundation
the case to the district court for consideration whether the
of Washington's petition for rehearing en banc is pending beIOLTA funds had been "taken" by the state, as well as the
fore the Ninth Circuit.
amount of "just compensation," if any, which is due to the
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (Feb.
challengers. [16:1 CRLR 198] Following a two-day bench
28, 2001), the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated federal restrictrial in September 1999, U.S. District Court Judge James R.
tions on arguments that attorneys who are funded through the
Nowlin held in Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal
Legal Services Corporation (LSC) are allowed to make on beAccess to Justice Foundation, 86 F. Supp. 2d 624 (Jan. 28,
half of clients in pursuing welfare claims. Since 1996, Con-

CaliforniaRegulatory Law Reporter* Volume 17, No. 2 (Winter 2001) * covers November 1999-April 2001

LEGAL/ACCOUNTING REGULATORY AGENCIES
gress has prohibited LSC from funding any organization that
represents clients in an attempt to amend or challenge existing
welfare laws. These funding restrictions apply even if the constitutional or statutory challenges become apparent only after
the legal representation is under way. In a 5-4 decision, the
majority found that this funding restriction constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination that interferes with the proper
functioning of attorneys and the court system. In its decision,
the majority distinguished Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991),
which upheld a federal policy prohibiting family planning agencies which receive federal funds from providing abortion counseling. According to the majority, Rust involved government
speech because the physicians in Rust spoke on behalf of the
government. Here, the attorneys are clearly not speaking for
the government but on behalf of their client-often against the
government, and the funding restrictions prevent legal services
attorneys from carrying out the traditional role and responsibilities of attorneys to "present all the reasonable and wellgrounded arguments necessary for proper resolution of the case"
and therefore distort the functioning of the judicial system. The
majority held that the statute is "an attempt to draw lines around
the LSC program to exclude from litigation those arguments
and theories Congress finds unacceptable but which by their
nature are within the province of the courts to consider."
Writing for the dissent, Justice Scalia found the case to
be indistinguishable from Rust, stating: "Today's decision is
quite simply inexplicable on the basis of our prior law. The
only difference between Rust and the present case is that the
former involved 'distortion' of (that is to say, refusal to subsidize) the normal work of doctors, and the latter involves
'distortion' of (that is to say, refusal to subsidize) the normal
work of lawyers. The Court's decision displays not only an
improper special solicitude for our own profession; it also
displays, I think, the very fondness for 'reform through the
courts'- the making of innumerable social judgments through
judge-pronounced constitutional imperatives- that prompted
Congress to restrict publicly funded litigation of this sort."
On March 20, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to
review the California Supreme Court's decision in Warden v.
State Barof California,21 Cal. 4th 628 (1999), in which the
California court upheld the constitutionality of the State Bar's
Minimum Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program. In
Warden, plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that the State Bar's
MCLE program violates his right to equal protection by exempting certain Bar members from its requirements; subsequent to the California court's decision, the legislature enacted and the Governor signed SB 144 (Schiff and Hertzberg)
(Chapter 342, Statutes of 1999), which repeals one of those
exemptions from the MCLE requirement and makes legislative findings supporting the remaining exemptions. [17:1
CRLR 209, 212-13]
On January 26,2000 in Greenbergv. State Bar, 78 Cal.
App. 4th 39 (2000), rehearingdenied Feb. 10, 2000, review
denied Apr. 26, 2000, the First District Court of Appeal held
that the Bar's requirement of MCLE courses relating to sub-

stance abuse, emotional distress, and elimination of bias does
not violate the first amendment. In Greenberg, California attorneys required to comply with the State Bar's MCLE requirements challenged the constitutionality of the MCLE program based on equal protection grounds, as in Warden, and
on first amendment grounds. The trial court granted summary
judgment to the State Bar.
The First District affirmed the trial court's ruling as to
the equal protection claim, saying that it is bound by the recent majority opinion of the California Supreme Court in
Warden to affirm the judgment in favor of the State Bar with
respect to this issue. The First District then considered plaintiffs' first amendment claim. The attorneys argued that the
MCLE program violates their first amendment right "to be
free of compulsory governmental propaganda in favor of an
ideological purpose with which appellants do not agree, and
which is not 'germane' or rationally related to the legitimate
goals of legal education for practitioners." The court first noted
that Warden had apparently decided that the MCLE program
requirements are rationally related to the "consumer protection" goals of the legislation and needs of the legal profession. In response to appellants' specific objections to MCLE
requirements mandating a certain number of classes relating
to the prevention of substance abuse and emotional distress
and the elimination of bias, the First District concluded that,
in light of Warden, these subjects are rationally related to the
consumer protection goals of the MCLE program.
In Mack v.State Bar of California,attorney Michael Mack
of Corona del Mar is challenging the Bar's public disclosure
of discipline to which he stipulated. In 1994, the Bar filed formal disciplinary charges against Mack; under Business and
Professions Code section 6086.1 (a), that filing converts a previously confidential State Bar investigation into a matter of
public record. In 1995, Mack stipulated to the issuance of a
"private reproval" as the discipline for his misconduct. The
stipulation provided: "The parties understand that although this
reproval is termed 'private,' it arises in a public proceeding.
Although the State Bar of California will not affirmatively provide any publicity to the disposition, the file, including the stipulation, [and] any order approving it, in this case will remain
public and will be available on any specific inquiry by a member of the public." In 1999, Mack discovered that the Bar was
disclosing the fact that Mack has a "public record of discipline" on its Internet Web site. The Web site did not disclose
the nature of the discipline, but rather invited interested parties
to contact the Bar, in writing or by telephone, and pay a charge
in order to obtain more information concerning Mack's disciplinary record. In December 1999, Mack brought suit against
the Bar, alleging that it had violated the terms of his stipulation
by posting notice of his disciplinary record on its Web site.
The Bar opposed Mack's suit, contending that it did not "affirmatively provide any publicity to the disposition," and that its
Web site is merely a far more efficient means of providing
public access to its public records of attorney discipline. In a
May 2000 decision, No. BC221528, Los Angeles County Su-
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perior Court Judge Madeleine Flier agreed with the Bar and
dismissed Mack's case, emphasizing that the information
available via the Internet is public information and is no different from the information that would be available through
a phone call or office visit to the State Bar (see MAJOR
PROJECTS). At this writing, Mack's appeal of Judge Flier's
decision is pending in the Second District Court of Appeal.
On August 14, 2000 in In re Eben Gossage, 23 Cal. 4th
1080 (2000), the California Supreme Court rejected a State
Bar Court recommendation that Eben Gossage be admitted
to the practice of law. At the age of 20, Gossage was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for the 1975 killing of his
sister. Gossage also suffered numerous other criminal convictions, including multiple felony convictions for forgery, a
crime of moral turpitude. After graduating from law school
in 1991 and passing the Bar exam in 1993, Gossage applied
for a moral character determination with the Committee of
Bar Examiners in 1994. Finding that he had since been rehabilitated, the State Bar Court recommended that he be admitted to the State Bar. The Supreme Court rejected that recommendation, finding that Gossage failed to sustain his burden
of proving rehabilitation. The court noted Gossage's apparent recovery from substance abuse, his academic achievements, and his community involvement since his last discharge
from parole in 1984. However, the court also found that
Gossage continued a pattern of misdemeanor convictions involving, for the most part, willful failures to appear in court
for traffic violations and to obey court orders from the time
he was paroled until he applied for admission to the Bar.
Moreover, the court noted that Gossage was untruthful on his
moral character application and failed to disclose the full extent of his criminal history. "In order to safeguard the public
and protect the integrity of the profession," the Supreme Court
concluded, "we cannot conclude Gossage has established his
present good moral character. We therefore reject the State
Bar Court's recommendation and decline to admit Gossage
to the practice of law."
Unlike numerous other states, the California Bar does
not offer reciprocity licensure to attorneys licensed in other
states. An out-of-state attorney who is licensed in another state
and who wishes to temporarily practice law in California must
apply for pro hac vice admission under California Rule of
Court 983, associate with a California State Bar member, and
pay a $50 fee to the State Bar. However, this limited admission is not available to attorneys who live in California or do
substantial business in the state-those attorneys must take
and pass the Attorney's Bar examination (a somewhat shortened version of the California Bar exam). In Paciulan v.
George, 229 F.3d 1226 (Oct. 17, 2000), cert. denied Jan. 8,
2001, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a challenge that this rule unconstitutionally discriminates against
Californians. The court first noted that appellants were represented by Joseph Giannini, who has challenged admissions
requirements to the State Bar in at least six other cases since
1987 on a variety of grounds. [10:4 CRER 187-88;8:3 CRLR

131] Here, the Court ruled that residents of this state who are
licensed elsewhere are not deprived of their privileges and
immunities under Article IV, or their first amendment rights
to speak for or associate with their clients or to petition the
government. According to the court, if these arguments were
accepted, "[a] California resident wishing to practice in California but wanting to avoid the difficult California bar examination could become a member of the bar of the state with
the least restrictive admissions requirement, then demand
admission to the California bar as a matter of right. The Constitution does not compel such a result. States have traditionally enjoyed the exclusive power to license and regulate members of their respective bars."
The Ninth Circuit also noted that "[w]hile the California
Legislature may choose to alter the requirements for pro hac
vice admission to practice in California courts, it is not within
the province of the federal courts to do so." The California
legislature has taken a first step toward reciprocity licensure
with its 2000 passage of SB 1782 (Morrow), which asks the
California Supreme Court to convene a task force to study
the issue and adopt rules allowing California admission of
other-state attorneys without passing the California Bar exam
(see 2000 LEGISLATION).

RECENT MEETINGS
On March 31,2000, the Committee on Communications
and Member Relations discussed the impact of fee scaling
now allowed for State Bar members who earn less than
$40,000 per year and/or less than $25,000 per year from the
practice of law (see MAJOR PROJECTS). According to staff,
11,000 attorneys qualified for scaling, and 9,000 of those
members were eligible for scaling as earning less than $25,000
in 1999. The numbers are expected to increase as several members complained that they did not realize that there is an option to scale and are requesting to do so after having already
paid their 2000 dues.
In November 2000, the Board approved Rule XVII of its
Rules Regulating Admission to Practice Law in California,
regarding testing accommodations for applicants with disabilities. The proposed rule was circulated for public comment in December 1999; no comments were received. The
new rule sets forth general policies and defines "disability,"
"physical impairment," "mental impairment," "qualified applicant with a disability," and "reasonable accommodation"
for purposes of applying for the First Year Law Students'
Examination or the California Bar Examination. The rule sets
forth procedures for submitting a petition for testing accommodations and provides for review of staff's decision if a
request for accommodation is modified or denied.
At its April 2001 meeting, the Board of Governors rejected a Conference of Delegates recommendation calling for
legislation to establish a five-year statute of limitations on
the commencement of attorney discipline matters, except
when the discipline is based upon a criminal conviction involving the practice of law or when the respondent waives
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the statute of limitations. The recommendation was opposed
by both the Committee on Regulation and Discipline and the
Committee on Legislation and Court Relations. OCTC also
opposed the legislation, saying that it does not properly balance public policy favoring the resolution of disputes and the
extinction of stale claims and because existing Rule 51 of the
Rules of Procedure provides a rule of limitations and appropriate tolling provisions.

FUTURE MEETINGS
2001: June 8-9 in San Francisco; July 27-28 in Los Angeles; September 6-9 (annual meeting) in Anaheim; October
19 (new member orientation) in Santa Barbara; December 78 in Los Angeles.
2002: January 25-26 in Los Angeles; March 15-17 in
Sonoma; May 3-4 in Los Angeles; June 21-22 in San Francisco; August 23-24 in Los Angeles; October 10 (new member orientation) in Monterey; October 10-13 (annual meeting) in Monterey; December 6-7 in San Francisco.
2003: January 24-26 in Oxnard; March 21-22 in Long
Beach; May 16-17 in San Francisco; July 25-26 in Los Angeles; September 3-4 (new member orientation) in Anaheim;
September 5-8 (annual meeting) in Anaheim; October 1718 in Los Angeles; December 5-6 in San Francisco.
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